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ABSTRACT
In the “Libet study” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported
time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that non-conscious brain processes
predetermine voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). While the
study’s basic results have been replicated, its validity and assumptions have been
questioned. Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence against the study’s assumption that
movement and intention to move are distinct events. In this study, in which researchers
did not train participants to distinguish between movement and intention, reports for
intention and movement were identical. This differed from the Libet study, in which
intention was reported significantly earlier in time than movement. The current study
sought to replicate the findings of Dominik et al. Participants (N = 22) were assigned to
one of two groups. Both groups performed the same tasks, differing only in order of task
completion. In both tasks participants made mouse clicks while tracking time via an
analog clock. In one task participants reported the moment they initiated their click. In
the other participants reported the moment they intended to click. Crucially, when given
instructions for the initial task, they were not told about the existence of the other task.
Results showed an interaction of group and task, F (1, 970) = 89.571, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .085.
The most crucial pairwise comparison, on the initial task, revealed no difference in
movement and intention reports. These findings suggest that intention reports in the Libet
study may be invalid.
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I.

Introduction

The famous and often cited “Libet study” by Benjamin Libet and colleagues
explored the neuroscience of voluntary movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl,
1983). Libet et al. were primarily concerned with the electroencephalographic (EEG)
activity preceding voluntary movements and how this activity temporally relates to the
conscious intention to make such movements. The fact that distinctive EEG consistently
precedes voluntary movements had been discovered by independent groups of
researchers in the 1960s (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Gilden, Vaughan, & Costa,
1966). These researchers found that a slow negative shift in EEG activity consistently
precedes voluntary movements by a range of .5 – 2 seconds. Kornhuber and Deecke
(1965) originally called this activity the “Bereitschaftspotential,” but it has come to be
known as the “Readiness Potential” (RP; refer to Appendix A for a list of abbreviated
terms used throughout the paper). In these studies and in the Libet study, voluntary
movements were self-paced spontaneous movements of the wrist and/or fingers.
The existence of the RP as a genuine precursor to voluntary movements was not
in doubt at the time of the Libet study (Libet et al. 1983) and is not in doubt today, as it
has been consistently found in replications (Keller & Heckhausen,1990; Haggard &
Eimer, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004).
The purpose of the Libet study was not to demonstrate the existence of the RP but to
build upon RP research by introducing of a method of timing the subjective conscious
intention associated with the voluntary movement. With this additional measure, the
Libet study provided the first investigation of the temporal relation between the
conscious intention to move and the activity leading up to the movement. The Libet
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study became famous because it injected some of the first neuroscientific evidence into
the debates concerning volition, consciousness, and free will. By operationalizing the
timing of participant’s conscious intention, Libet et al. offered a way to compare a
subjective intention to objective measures of the nature and timing of related brain
activity.
EEG, ERPs, and the Readiness Potential
EEG activity is measured via electrodes on the scalp. For neurons to produce
activity that can be measured at the scalp, they must fire (i.e., propagate an electrical
signal) simultaneously with thousands of other such neurons (Kappenman & Luck,
2011). These collections of neurons must be oriented such that, when active, their postsynaptic potentials (PSPs) sum together to produce a significantly large electrical signal
which travels towards the scalp. How PSPs reach the scalp and become measurable is
similar to how photons of light create the beam of a flashlight; the beam can be seen
only when many photons are traveling in more or less the same direction at around the
same time. If only a few photons are activated or the photons are scattered in every
direction, no beam will be created. When measuring EEG, electrical activity will not
reach the surface and, thus, will not be measurable, for those neurons which do not fire
with sufficient numbers of other neurons or which are not oriented in such a manner
that their activity reaches the scalp. Most EEG activity is produced by the activity of
pyramidal neurons in the cerebral cortex, since these neurons are more likely than
others to meet all these requirements.
When EEG activity is measured at a specific site on the scalp and averaged
across many trials, an event-related potential (ERP) is created. As the name indicates,
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the ERP is an electrical potential related to a specific neural event. ERPs are graphically
represented as waveforms. By averaging across many trials, which can be done within a
single participant or across multiple participants, only the EEG activity related to the
neural event in question remains. The activity that is not related to the neural event (i.e.,
noise) averages to zero as more trials are averaged, so that a distinctive waveform of the
event-related activity is formed. ERPs are created by time-locking EEG activity to the
event in question, whether the event be a sensory stimulus, a response, a spontaneous
movement, etc.
The RP is one such ERP waveform (Figure 1). As noted, it is a slow negative
shift in activity occurring between .5 to 2 seconds before a spontaneous voluntary
movement. It occurs at the Cz electrode site on the standard 10-20 System of EEG
measurement. Cz, also known as the vertex, is the site at the top of the skull, equidistant
from the ears and halfway between the inion and nasion of the skull (i.e., between the
most anterior and posterior points of the skull). Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) asked
participants to make freely-paced spontaneous wrist flexions and recorded their EEG
activity at Cz. They created an ERP by time-locking EEG data collection to the wrist
movement and taking the grand average of all participants’ data across all trials. Since
the actions carried out by participants were endogenous and spontaneous – that is, since
they were not responses to external stimuli and were not preplanned – Kornhuber and
Deecke concluded that the RP was a precursor to spontaneous voluntary movements.
Subsequent replications (Deecke, Scheid, & Kornhuber, 1969; Libet, Wright, &
Gleason 1982), as well as independent experiments (Gilden, Vaughan, & Costa, 1966;
Vaughan, Costa, & Ritter, 1968; Brinkman & Porter, 1979; Roland, Larsen, Lassen, &
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Figure 1: Basic results of the Libet study.
The two waveforms are the event-related potentials for two different types of readiness
potentials.
Source: Pocket, S., Banks, W. P., & Gallagher, S. (2006). Introduction. In S. Pockett, W. P.
Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), Does consciousness cause behavior? (pp.1-6). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

Skinhoj, 1980), led to the RP being firmly established as a genuine precursor to
voluntary movements. Citing many of these studies and others, Eccles (1982) noted that
the RP had been localized to the supplementary motor area (SMA). Eccles speculated
that if conscious intention could be measured, it would precede the RP. That is, he
claimed that the SMA activity measured by the RP is caused and, thus, preceded by
conscious intention. This is where the Libet study entered the picture.
The Libet Study
The primary aim of the study by Libet et al. (1983) was to effectively measure
the conscious intention to make a self-paced, spontaneous voluntary movement and to
temporally compare this intention to the RP generated before the movement. Conscious
4

intention was measured via participants’ reports of the position of a clock hand when
they experienced the intention to move. The famous and controversial result of the Libet
study was that the RP began, on average, about 350ms before the reported conscious
intention to move (see Results and Conclusions of the Libet Study subsection below).
The temporal sequence of events was understood to be the RP, then conscious intention,
then movement. Libet et al. concluded that the RP, not the conscious intention to move,
was the initiator of voluntary movement. Since the RP did not temporally correspond to
the onset of conscious intention, it was concluded that it reflected the brain’s
unconscious initiation of movement. They tentatively concluded that conscious control
plays a restricted role in the “initiation and control” of voluntary movements, at least in
simple voluntary movements like those carried out by their participants (Libet et al.,
1983, p. 641).
In an attempt to salvage the notion that conscious intention plays some role in
the initiation and control of voluntary movements, Libet et al. (1983) hypothesized that
a small window of time – the approximately 150-200ms between the conscious
intention to move and the movement itself – potentially provided individuals with a
short period in which to inhibit a previously unconsciously prepared movement. This is
known as the veto window and is shown in Figure 1. In other words, although Libet et
al. claimed that their findings were evidence that consciously intended movements are
actually unconsciously initiated, they noted the possibility of conscious intention having
a binary ability to allow or disallow those movements to occur in the final 200ms before
they are programmed to occur. The main thrust of the Libet study and its many
replications and variants has been the temporal relation between the RP and the
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conscious intention to move. The current study is mainly concerned with this relation
and has not examined the possibility of a veto window. The implications of the Libet
study for the role of conscious intention in voluntary movements are explored in the
Discussion section.
The Libet study has been replicated and innovated upon dozens of times. As
noted by Banks and Pockett (2007), most replications have produced similar results and
found similar relationships between the RP and conscious intention in voluntary
movements. Some examples are Keller and Heckhausen (1990), Haggard and Eimer
(1999), Trevena and Miller (2002), and Lau, Rogers, Haggard, and Passingham (2004).
Many researchers and theorists have made bold interpretations of the findings, arguing
that the findings could be generalized to all consciously intended actions. For many, the
conclusion was that unconscious activity is the true casual source of intentions and
actions; conscious intention was relegated to the status of an impotent epiphenomenon.
In this view, the conscious sense of agency (i.e., control over movements) is an illusion.
Some theorists have used the study’s results as a foundational part of broad theoretical
accounts of consciousness, in which conscious decision making is an illusory mental
construct rather than a causal mechanism (Gazzaniga, 2000; Wegner, 2002; Eagleman,
2004; Choudhary & Blakemore, 2006; Matsuhashi & Hallett 2008; Harris, 2010). For
example, Eagleman (2004) relies heavily on the Libet study and some of its replications
in formulating a model of volition in which voluntary movements are mainly
unconsciously generated and conscious intention is inferred after the movement occurs.
It should be noted that this and other theories are not wholly dependent upon the Libet
study or its variants; they cite other independent evidence as well, such that they might
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continue to have support for their theories even in the absence of the Libet study’s
results. However, these theories would be considerably weaker and/or more speculative
without these results.
Other researchers and theorists have criticized and scrutinized various aspects of
the study, including its assumptions, conceptual basis, operationalization, methodology,
data gathering, statistical analyses, and interpretations. Although the majority of
replications have more or less duplicated the original findings, philosophical critiques
and the results of many recent empirical studies have raised serious doubts about the
Libet study’s basic results and typical interpretations (Mele, 2013; Nachev & Hacker,
2014). For example, Schurger et al. (2012) and others provided evidence that the
characteristics of the RP are largely artifacts of the process of creating an ERP from
voluntary movements. In a conceptual analysis, Nachev and Hacker (2014) questioned
the assumption that spontaneous voluntary movements always have a reportable
intention before they occur. Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that participants
may report the movement and the intention to move at the same time if they are not
previously informed that the two events are supposed to be two separate events (see
Other Criticisms section below). Current research must resolve these and other issues
beyond reasonable doubt before the findings and the theories built upon them can be
embraced. Before exploring the study’s results, interpretations, and criticisms in more
detail, let us first examine the experimental methodology employed in this novel and
groundbreaking study.
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Experimental Setup of the Libet Study
The Libet study (Libet et al., 1983) asked participants to monitor a revolving dot
on an oscilloscope while making voluntary wrist flexions. The oscilloscope and rotating
dot served as a fast-moving clock used by participants to make estimates of the timings
of three events (see Figure 2 for an example of a Libet clock). Participants were to
report the position of the dot when they estimated each event to have occurred. The “S”
event was the perception of a tactile stimulus (i.e., a pulse) delivered on the back of the
hand. The “W” event was when the participant wanted to or “felt the urge” to make a
wrist flexion (Libet et al., 1983, p. 625). The “M” event was when the movement
actually occurred. Participants were specifically told that the movement should be “a
quick abrupt flexion of the fingers and/or the wrist” of the right hand after the dot had
made one full revolution (Libet et al., 1983, p. 625). Electroencephalographic (EEG)
data was collected during the entire experiment. It was time-locked to
electromyographic (EMG) activity caused by the wrist flexions. The computer began
recording EEG data once the wrist flexion caused EMG activity to surpass a threshold
value. Participants were trained to make brisk movements so that the EMG data would
trigger data recording no later than 10-20ms after movement.
Six right-handed individuals participated in the study. They underwent extensive
training and were given strict instructions about how to complete all experimental tasks.
They were split into two groups. Participants made W, M, and S reports in distinct
series, with each series containing 40 trials (refer to Appendix A as needed for a table of
abbreviated terms). Only one type of report was made for each trial within a series;
there was no interspersing of reports within a single series. Group 2 participants were
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Figure 2: Example of analog clock used in Libet study.
Source: Doyle, B. (2018). Benjamin Libet. Retrieved from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/libet/

given instructions to “let the urge to act appear on its own at any time without any
preplanning or concentration on when to act,” in order to encourage them to be
“spontaneous” and “capricious” in their movements (Libet et al., 1983, p. 625). These
instructions were not given to Group 1 until the latter one-third of sessions. In the tactile
stimulus series, pulses were delivered to the back of the right hand at irregular intervals
after the dot had made one revolution. Participants were then to report S time.
The researchers emphasized to participants that the W report should refer to the
earliest appearance of “W awareness” corresponding to a “specific urge to act” (Libet et
al., 1983, p. 627). This was done so that participants would distinguish the urge to act
that immediately preceded action from any general preplanning that might occur earlier
in time. Additionally, this helped participants distinguish between W and M reports; for
M reports they were instructed to report the “awareness that [they] actually moved”
(Libet et al., 1983, p. 627). Within W series, Libet et al. made a post hoc distinction
between Type I, Type II, and Type III series, which had been made in prior research
(Libet et al., 1982). Type I series were those in which the participants admitted to
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having preplanned actions on some trials. They specifically wanted to avoid any general
preplanning of movements; they wanted participants to move as soon as they “felt the
urge” to do so, as opposed to formulating some plan to move like waiting for the
revolving dot to reach some decided-upon interval on the oscilloscope (Libet et al.,
1983, p. 625). Type II series were those in which no preplanning was reported. Type III
series were a special category of Type II series in which the RP showed less activity
than usual.
Participants used two distinct modes of recall in order to make W, M, and S
reports. The absolute mode asked them to simply report at which clock second the dot
was when the event in question (W, M, or S, depending on the series and trial) occurred.
The order mode asked them to report whether the final position of the dot, which
continued to move even after the event in question occurred, was earlier or later on the
oscilloscope than the position of the dot when the event occurred. In other words, once
the dot finally stopped the participant had to report whether the stopping place was
before or after W, M or S time. There were no meaningful differences in the results
yielded by these two methods. Subsequent replications and variants have almost
exclusively used only the absolute method, and this study has conformed to that pattern.
Results and Conclusions of the Libet Study
Averaged across all participants, W reports came out to be about 200ms earlier
than EMG onset time (i.e., when the movement occurred). Figure 1 shows a timeline of
these results. Participants’ average M time was about 90ms prior to actual movement.
Participants’ S reports were used to “correct” W and M reports for any bias associated
with the method of reporting (Libet et al., 1983, p. 631). Libet et al. (1983) believed that
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any common biases associated with the revolving dot method of reporting would be
stable across W, M, and S. Since the delivered stimulus was objectively measured, S
reports could be compared to this measure in order to calculate their accuracy. This bias
averaged to about 50ms and was an early bias; participants reported S times as 50ms
earlier than when the stimulus was actually delivered. A 50ms correction was applied to
W and M reports, such that the average W report after correction was about 150ms prior
to movement (corrected from 200ms), and the average M report was about 40ms prior
to movement (corrected from 90ms). W reports consistently preceded M reports across
participants, and this difference averaged to about 115ms. Of course, this correction
method assumes that biases are correlated across all three conditions. It assumes that an
exogenous tactile stimulus, an endogenous intention, and an internally initiated
movement can truly be compared in terms of perception and reporting bias.
The RP onset was determined by two methods. The first method involved two
researchers independently using “eye-ball inspection” to determine the discrete time
point at which the “main negative shift” began (i.e., when the slow negative shift
characteristic of the RP began) (Libet et al., 1983, p. 632). The second method
computed the discrete time point at which 90% of the area under the RP preceded EMG
zero-time. In other words, this method made a preliminary calculation of the total area
under the RP waveform between the RP and movement onset and then set the RP onset
as the time point after which 90% of this total area occurred. There were no meaningful
difference in the results yielded by these two methods.
As previously highlighted, RP onset was found to precede W. The effect was
“highly significant” even when accounting for possible moderating factors such as
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mode of recall, mode of calculating RP onset, and type of RP (I, II, or III) (Libet et al.,
1983, p. 634). As expected, Type I RPs (i.e., those series in which participants admitted
to having done some preplanning), had the largest intervals between RP and W, but
Type II and Type III RPs (i.e., those series in which participants claimed that all
movements were spontaneous) still had substantial intervals. The Type II RPs and
intervals were deemed most appropriate for use by Libet et al. (1983) because they
showed normal RP behavior (unlike Type III RPs) and did not involve preplanning
(unlike Type I). The main findings which this study cites and which have been cited by
others – that the RP onsets about 500ms prior to movement and that W occurs about
150ms prior to movement, leading to an interval between the RP and W of about 350ms
– come from the analysis of Type II RPs. Within Type II RPs, some participants’
individual series did not conform to these grand averages, but most did. For a discussion
of the importance of outliers and individual performance, see the Other Criticisms
section below. Libet et al. hypothesized that the prolonged RP activity before W time in
Type I series, which was 650ms or more, was “not necessarily associated with freedom
of choosing when to act,” while the RP for the more common Type II and Type III
series reflected “the cerebral volitional process uniquely involved in initiating a freely
voluntary, fully endogenous act” (Libet et al., 1983, p. 636). From these results, Libet et
al. (1983) made the general conclusion that:
the brain evidently ‘decides’ to initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate the act
at a time before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision
has taken place. It is concluded that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous
voluntary act, of the kind studied here, can and usually does begin
unconsciously. (p. 640)
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Libet et al. (1983) also claimed that since previous research had established
wrist flexions as reliable examples of spontaneous freely voluntary acts, the results and
conclusions could be extended to other spontaneous voluntary acts performed without
conscious deliberation or planning. However, they specifically note that their results do
not preclude the possibility that other types of voluntary movements may follow a
different temporal sequence of events. They specifically referred to voluntary acts
involving some form of deliberation. They did not attempt to extrapolate their results,
which pertained to voluntary movements, to non-spontaneous voluntary movements,
particularly those involving conscious deliberation. Libet et al. (1983) also proposed the
aforementioned veto window between W and M times, in which participants might have
the ability to consciously abort or inhibit unconsciously planned movement.
Criticism of the Readiness Potential
The fundamental discovery of the Libet study (Libet et al., 1983) was the
temporal relation between the RP and intention. This relation would come into question
if one or both of these components (i.e., the RP or W reports) was found to be
systematically biased by operationalization, methodology, or some other source of
error. Let us begin with a closer examination of the RP. Verbaarschot, Farquhar, and
Haselager (2015) replicated the Libet study and demonstrated that disparate results can
be obtained for RP onset. The RP onset is the time at which distinct RP activity (i.e., a
slow negative shift at Cz and/or nearby electrodes) can be observed in comparison to
baseline activity in the same area. The key to determining RP onset is finding a distinct
departure from baseline activity, but there is no single universally agreed-upon method
of calculation for making this determination. These authors used the same two
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calculation methods as Libet (i.e., the eyeball inspection method and the 90% area
method) but also introduced a third, more robust method using a t-test. The t-test
method’s criterion for RP onset is the three consecutive discrete time points at which
activity was significantly different than baseline activity in the predicted direction.
Thus, the RP onset occurs when the slow negative shift begins and continues for at least
three consecutive time points. This method led to significantly later RP onsets than the
other two methods. However, Trevena and Miller (2002) used a method similar to the ttest method and found earlier RP onsets, so it is not clear whether using a more robust
method will lead to earlier or later RP onsets. Neither method is completely objective,
since the eyeball inspection method requires a researcher decision and the t-test method
involves an arbitrary use of three time points rather than some other number, but some
level of arbitrariness seems to be inherent in calculating RP onsets. The current study
will use both the t-test method and the eyeball inspection method in order to compare
their results (see Future Analyses subsection of Discussion).
These authors also demonstrated that RP onset was significantly affected by
which EEG filters were used (Verbaarschot et al, 2015). Drastic differences in RP onset
were obtained when using a high-pass filter of .5Hz versus 1Hz. The difference in the
two filters was that the 1Hz filter removed frequencies between .5Hz and 1Hz, while the
.5Hz filter did not remove them. The 1Hz filter found RP onsets at about 500ms prior to
movement and the .5Hz filter found RP onset at about 1200ms prior to movement.
Thus, a substantial difference of about 700ms was found between the two filters. These
findings demonstrate that determining RP onset is a precarious endeavor in which minor
differences in methods can lead to drastic changes. Future replications should follow the
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example of Verbaarschot et al. and employ and report multiple methods of determining
RP onset. This study will calculate RP onset using the two different high-pass filters of
.5Hz and 1Hz (see Future Analyses subsection of Discussion).
As noted, the RP was already well established and accepted at the time of the
Libet study as cerebral activity occurring in the SMA and preceding voluntary
movement. The RP has been considered to be the unconscious initiator of voluntary
movements and to represent the earliest stages of movement preparation. In light of
recent studies, however, the RP has been reinterpreted as being largely an artifact of
time-locking EEG signals to voluntary movements in order to create ERPs (Schurger,
Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012; Jo, Hinterberger, Wittmann, Borghardt, & Schmidt, 2013;
Schurger, Mylopoulos, & Rosenthal, 2016; Schmidt, Jo, Wittmann, & Hinterberger,
2016). Borrowing from well-established research on the nature of perceptual decisionmaking, Schurger et al. (2012) modeled the RP using a leaky stochastic accumulator
model. In such models, which have long been accepted for perceptual decision-making,
a perceptual decision is made once accumulating sensory evidence reaches one
threshold over another. Once a particular perceptual choice accumulates enough
evidence to cross a threshold, a visual decision is made in favor of that choice over
other competing choices. In the Libet task, there is no sensory evidence to accumulate
for use in the decision to move; the choice of when to move is supposed to be fully
spontaneous, when participants experience the urge to move. In their model, Schurger et
al. (2012, p. 16776) posit that such a decision uses “slow intrinsic noise” in place of
sensory data; subjects accumulate such noise and “wait for a random threshold-crossing
event.” This noise is comprised of fluctuating shifts in cerebral activity, which can be
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positive or negative. In this view, participants base the decision to move – that is, they
base their conscious intention to move – on fluctuating shifts in internal noise. The
shifts are largely random, but when averaged together into an ERP, they give the
appearance of a negative shift slowly increasing over time (i.e., the RP). This prolonged
RP waveform is a misleading artifact caused by time-locking EEG activity to voluntary
movement; a prolonged RP is responsible for the large interval between RP onset and
intention, which was fundamental to the Libet study’s findings and interpretations.
According to Schurger et al. (2012), the temporal autocorrelation of stochastic
(i.e., random) fluctuations in neural activity is responsible for this artifact. Temporal
autocorrelation refers to how fluctuating shifts in EEG activity self-correlate by
repeating in time over and over again. Thus, if activity which includes such shifts is
time-locked and averaged into an ERP, it will appear non-random; the created ERP will
appear to slowly accumulate in a negative or positive direction instead of being
averaged out to zero. Schurger et al. (2012) replicated the Libet study and used their
leaky stochastic accumulator model to effectively predict the actual RP data they
obtained from participants. These authors concluded that the decision to move is likely
not made unconsciously at the point in time corresponding to the RP onset. Instead, they
propose that it may occur closer in time to the actual movement and be “coincident with
average subjective estimates of the time of the intention to move (Schurger et al., 2012,
p. 16776).” In other words, if some or all of the RP is comprised of fluctuating activity
unrelated to the conscious decision to move, the actual decision may indeed be
consciously determined. Conscious intention may coincide with or precede the cortical
motor activity leading to movement, after all, because the purported onset of movement
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initiation (i.e., the RP onset) has been shown to be invalid. Of course, such a finding
does not preclude the possibility that there is other discoverable activity which may
consistently precede conscious intention in voluntary movements, but the finding does
show that the RP onset is not a valid indicator of specific unconscious movement
preparation (see the Philosophical Issues subsection of the Discussion for elaboration).
In a follow-up paper, Schurger et al. (2016) claimed that the activity corresponding to
voluntary movement initiation is likely much later than the Libet study and other
research has indicated. They cited their own work and the work of others as providing
converging evidence that the “neuronal commitment to move” is most likely 150-200ms
before actual movement (Schurger et al., 2016, p. 79). This time frame is basically
identical to that of the intention times reported by the Libet study and its replications.
They speculated that the fluctuations which comprise the RP may influence the time of
conscious intention but that the slow build-up of negative activity that is characteristic
of the RP is not indicative of an unconscious decision to initiate movement.
Many questions still remain, however. What kind of influence does the RP have
on conscious intention? If temporal autocorrelation is inevitable when making these
types of ERPs, why are negative shifts autocorrelating instead of positive shifts?
Building on the results of Schurger et al. (2012; 2016), Jo et al. (2013) found that the
negative amplitude of the RP for voluntary movements is due to the averaging process.
By sorting individual trials by the type of slope of the RP (positive or negative), these
authors determined that the RP is actually a mixture of positive and negative slow
accumulating activity. Trials in which the RP was positive accounted for 32.84% all
trials. Because the proportion of negative RP trials was much larger than the proportion
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of positive RP trials (67.16% vs. 32.84%), the grand average RP became negative. It is
a well-established fact that ERPs can lead to such misleading results and must be
interpreted with caution (Luck, 2014). However, the authors pointed out that voluntary
movements are clearly more likely during negative shifts, since negative shifts
outnumbered positive shifts at about a 2:1 ratio. In this study participants also
completed no-movement trials in which they passively listened to tones. For these, there
was not a negative RP prior to tone onset when an ERP was calculated, due to the fact
that the number of negative and positive shifts had almost an equal ratio (50.45%
positive and 49.55% negative). This was further evidence that the 2:1 ratio of shifts is
specifically associated with voluntary movements. Based on this unequal ratio and the
fact that movements can occur following a positive RP, the authors concluded that
negative shifts facilitate but do not determine the conscious intention to move.
Specifically, the processes reflected by negative shifts may simply “facilitate a
movement in the near future” in some way but not reflect decision processes; they
“might more readily lead to an impulse to act” but are not correlates of motor planning
(Jo et al., 2013, p. 500). If negative shifts are correlates of motor planning, they should
be present in 100% of trials, but this is obviously not the case.
Another recent study replicated these RP findings, finding that about 33% of
trials had positive shifts while about 67% had negative shifts (Schmidt et al., 2016).
These results are shown in Figure 3. These authors distinguished between the early RP
and the late RP, a distinction which has been made elsewhere as well and will be
employed in the remainder of this paper (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006; Jo et al., 2013;
Verbaarschot et al., 2015; Schmidt et al., 2016). All previous and forthcoming
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Figure 3: Results of the study by Schmidt et al. (2016)
Source: Schmidt, S., Jo, H., Wittmann, M., & Hinterberger, T. (2016). ‘Catching the waves’ – slow
cortical potentials as moderator of voluntary action. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 68,
639-650.

references to the RP apply to the entire RP, which is comprised of both the early RP and
the late RP. In a general review of research related to the RP, Shibasaki and Hallett
(2006) showed that the early RP occurs up until 300-400ms before movement, at which
point the late RP begins. The early RP is a slowly increasing negative shift, and the late
RP is marked by an abrupt increase in the slope of this negative shift. Verbaarschot et
al. (2015) also found that the late RP consistently has a steeper slope in comparison to
the early RP. While the early RP activity is found bilaterally in the SMA and is
maximal at the Cz electrode site, the late RP occurs in the contralateral motor cortex
and is maximal at the C1 or C2 electrode site, depending on which hand was involved
in the movement (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). Thus, the late RP is much closer in time
to the conscious intention than is the early RP, and it occurs in the motor cortex of the
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hemisphere contralateral to the hand that is being used to respond. Shibasaki and Hallett
(2006, p. 2341), writing before the findings of Jo et al. (2013) and Schmidt et al. (2012;
2016), noted that the early RP likely reflects general cortical “readiness” or
“excitability” for movement and postulated that the late RP might be related to the
conscious processes related to the intention to move.
Schmidt et al. (2016) found a late RP onset of about 400ms prior to movement
and noted that the early RP is most likely not related to specific movement preparation.
This accords with the findings of Jo et al. (2013), which showed a split between the
early RP and late RP, around 500ms prior to movement. Both groups of researchers
concluded that the early RP plays a limited role in voluntary movements, most likely
that of an urge. In this view, voluntary movements are possible whether the early RP is
positive or negative, but negative shifts increase the probability of a person
experiencing an impulse which may be acted upon. However, both groups of
researchers specifically state that their findings apply only to the early RP, not the late
RP. However, both groups note that the onset of the late RP is the point at which
positive and negative shifts begin to differ in behavior. Prior to this point, they show no
significant differences in behavior (e.g., amplitude, fluctuations) aside from their
polarity. However, at this point, slow positive shifts became steep negative shifts, while
negative shifts continued in their negative direction but also became steeper. This is an
important finding because it indicates that the late RP, unlike the early RP, should be
consistently negative. Thus, the late RP is likely to provide a more reliable and realistic
ERP which would more genuinely reflect a specific underlying pattern of activity
related to voluntary movement.
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Schmidt et al. (2016) found that the late RP begins about 400ms prior to
movement, while Jo et al. (2015) found that it begins about 500ms prior to movement.
Shibasaki and Hallett (2006) placed it between 300-400ms prior to movement. Refer to
Figure 4 for a depiction of the split between the early RP and late RP. On the whole, the
late RP appears to occur sometime between 300-500ms prior to movement. Future
research is needed to examine the exact timing of the late RP, as well as its temporal
relationship to intention. This study is primarily concerned with this relationship, not
with the relationship between the early RP and intention. As discussed below, many
lines of evidence suggest that the late RP and intention may be closer in time than most
previous studies suggest (also, see the Other Criticisms subsection below).

Figure 4: Idealized depiction of the RP in relation to movement (“Action”).
The RP has been split into Part 1 and Part 2 at about -400ms, corresponding to the
early RP and late RP.
Source: Verbaarschot, C, Farquhar, J, & Haselager, P. (2015). Lost in time…The
search for intentions and readiness potentials. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 300315.
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The previously cited studies of Jo et al. (2013) and Schmidt et al. (2016) found
the late RP to occur about 400-500ms prior to movement. This is about 200-300ms
earlier than most reported intention times, but these authors did not collect intention
reports in these studies which could be compared to the late RP onset. However,
Schmidt et al. (2016) cited a previous study by Jo et al. (2016) as evidence that the
conscious decision to move occurs during the late RP. This study examined eventrelated desynchronization (ERD) of beta-band activity over the motor cortex
contralateral to the hand used for movement. Beta-band activity, occurring at 13-30Hz,
is an established index of waking consciousness, most notably associated with attention,
concentration and motor control. Beta-band ERD is the desynchronization of beta-band
oscillations, which has been shown to be related to general movement preparation
(Wijk, Beek, & Daffertshofer, 2012). Jo et al. (2016) showed that the beta-band ERD of
the contralateral motor cortex was positively correlated with earlier subjective
experiences of urges (i.e., intention reports) in the 200-400ms prior to movement, as
well as in the 0-200ms before movement. Those with higher increases in ERD during
these time intervals had earlier reports. This task was similar to the standard Libet-style
task; participants were asked to make spontaneous voluntary movements. The authors
suggested that there may be an early and late beta-band ERD, with the early part
reflecting general movement preparation (i.e., readiness to move when the urge arises)
and the late part reflecting the conscious intention to move, somewhere within the final
0-400ms before movement.
Miller, Shepherdson, and Trevena (2011) provided evidence that monitoring the
clock during Libet-style tasks is at least partially responsible for the RP. In one of the
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study’s two experiments, participants completed a variant of the Libet task under two
conditions. Both conditions asked for a spontaneous key press, but only one condition
required participants to monitor the clock and make an intention report; the other group
simply made the movement. The clock-monitoring condition led to RPs with
significantly more negative amplitude shifts in the 2s preceding the button press. In the
study’s other experiment, participants also underwent two clock conditions (i.e., clockmonitoring and no clock-monitoring) and made judgments of pitch tones by pressing
the key corresponding to the tone with higher pitch. Clock-monitoring likewise led to
significantly more negative RP shifts in this experiment, in the two seconds prior to
tone onset. Note that the RP was not calculated for the key press indicating judgement
of tone pitch; it was calculated for the onset of the tone itself. While these results were
calculated for the overall RP, they are probably equally applicable to the late RP.
This finding has two important implications. First, in non-movement tasks as
well as movement tasks, RP activity is influenced by clock-monitoring. The clock itself
is consistently leading to more negative shifts in the RP. For this reason, Miller et al.
(2011) recommend a new approach to Libet-style studies in which participants make
voluntary movements without clock-monitoring on one set of trials (movement-only
trials) and with clock monitoring on other trials (intention report trials). This would
allow the RP to be calculated without the influence of clock-monitoring. The current
study has followed the advice of these authors; as one part of the study, the late RP and
intention were measured on separate trials (see Future Analyses subsection of
Discussion).
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Second, this finding provides further corroboration that at least part of the RP is
not from specific unconscious movement preparation, since RPs like those prior to
voluntary movements can also be calculated prior to tone onsets. Because there cannot
have been specific movement preparation at the time of passively waiting for a tone,
they cannot be exclusively from unconscious motor initiation leading inevitably to
movement. Hermann, Pauen, Min, Busch, and Rieger (2008, p. 156) had similar
findings and concluded that the RP “seems to reflect a general expectation or an
unspecific motor preparation of both hands.” In this study, participants had to respond
to visual stimuli by making a left or right hand button press, and the RP was calculated
for the time leading up to the stimulus presentation. The results clearly showed an RP
well before the stimulus onset, which indicates that an RP was calculated before a
specific movement was made. The aforementioned research on the RP, which indicated
that it is likely related to an increased urge to move but not specific initiatory activity,
accords with this finding. In addition, the study by Schurger et al. (2012, p. 16777)
included a task called “Libetus Interruptus” which further supports these findings. In
this task, participants were to make a movement immediately after hearing an auditory
signal. These researchers found that participants had faster reaction times when ongoing
stochastic fluctuations were most similar to the RP. That is, participants responded
fastest to auditory signals when there was a random negative shift already occurring
prior to the signal. This was interpreted as an indication that the negative activity
characteristic of the early RP is related to the threshold for acting on an urge; when the
activity is more negative, it is closer to threshold. Thus, a voluntary movement is
facilitated or made more likely by ongoing negative shifts, which is why these
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movements occur disproportionately during negative shifts. This is the reason that the
RP (i.e., a slow negative shift) is found when an ERP is time-locked to such
movements.
This accords with the aforementioned studies by Schmidt et al. (2016) and Jo et
al. (2013), which demonstrated that the early RP contains negative and positive trials at
a 2:1 ratio. Whether these shifts are related to conscious activity, unconscious activity,
urges, or some other phenomena is one question for future research. While most of
these authors have claimed that the RP is related to the urge to move, it seems plausible
that RPs reflect general movement preparation or expectation, given the evidence that
some RPs could not have been for specific motor plans. It also seems plausible that the
RP is related to generic movement preparation – to a literal neuronal “readiness” to
move. Perhaps negative and positive shifts are related to the waxing and waning,
respectively, of the general readiness of the involved motor networks. As the brain
anticipates a movement which it already knows much about (i.e., what movement will
be made, how to make it, the window of time in which it will be made, etc.), perhaps
negative activity reflects its increased readiness, while positive shifts are returns to a
less ready state.
In light of all these findings, the early RP and late RP must be put into proper
perspective. Although Miller et al. (2011) found convincing evidence that clockmonitoring contributes to the negativity of the RP, this does not appear to be the main
cause of the RP. In the studies by Schurger et al. (2012) and Hermann et al. (2008), RPs
were found in the absence of clock-monitoring and intention reports. In addition, one
can confidently conclude that what remains of the RP after clock-monitoring effects are
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removed is not from unconscious initiatory activity that leads to movement or conscious
intention. It is most likely related to the urge to move or to general movement
preparation. As indicated by Shibasaki and Hallett (2006), Jo et al. (2013), Schmidt et
al. (2016), and Verbaarschot et al. (2015), the late RP is consistently negative and is
steeper than the early RP, such that its ERPs should more accurately reflect specific
neural events rather than an unequal ratio of positive and negative shifts. Furthermore,
the study by Jo et al. (2016) suggested that the beta-band ERD occurring in the final
400ms before movement – which is nearly identically was related to the conscious
decision to move. For these reasons, this study is primarily concerned with the late RP,
not the RP, and its temporal relationship to intention. In order to provide meaningful
findings about the nature of the relationship between the late RP and intention, this
study’s main focus must be the precise measurement of the timing of each. It
investigates the precise influence of clock-monitoring on the late RP (Miller et al.,
2011) and will employ multiple methods of determining late RP onset, as well as
multiple data filters (Verbaarschot et al., 2015). See the Future Analyses subsection of
the Discussion for more details.
Other Criticisms
The validity of intention reports has come under much scrutiny. Using
discrepancies in the original Libet study as a starting point, a recent study (Dominik et
al., 2017) provided evidence that participants may not naturally make a distinction
between moving and intending to move. In this study, participants were divided into
groups and asked to complete the movement (M) task and the intention (W) task. The
groups differed only in the order in which they completed the tasks. Crucially, when
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completing the first task, groups were not informed of the nature of the other task.
Results showed that means did not differ between the groups on the first task
completed, despite the fact that one group was reporting intention and one group was
reporting movement. The means relative to the objective time of movement for each
group were near -10ms (i.e., 10ms prior to the objective time of movement). Thus, both
groups made reports near the actual time of movement.
Dominik et al. (2017) speculated that the intention reports in the Libet study
may be artifacts of the experimental setup and/or the instructions given to participants.
Perhaps participants in the normal Libet study setup, instead of actually perceiving
intention in the tasks, are forced into cognitively inferring that intention reports must
occur before movement reports. Dominik et al. argued that their findings were evidence
that there is only one event to report in the Libet study, that of movement. When
participants are asked to report intention but are not aware of a distinction between
intention and movement, they simply report intention at the same time as movement.
When participants are aware of the movement/intention distinction, as in a normal Libet
study setup, they infer that their intention reports should precede their movement
reports. Dominik et al. (2017, p. 260) claim that in the normal Libet study setup,
participants show an “anchoring” effect; the experience of moving and making a
movement report serves as an anchor from which to infer when an intention report
should occur. Dominik et al. concluded that their findings are evidence that intention
reports in the Libet study lack validity, since they appear to be inferences rather than
genuine reports.
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Other lines of research have also provided evidence that intention is inferred or
constructed. Banks and Isham (2009), as well as Haggard and Clark (2003), provided
evidence that intention reports in the Libet study are retrospectively inferred based on
the time of movement and can be influenced by pairing the movement with a delayed
auditory tone. These reports were shown to be delayed more as the tone was more
delayed from movement time. Although these authors concluded that their results were
evidence that conscious intention does not cause the movement, the results might just as
well lead to the conclusion that obtained intention reports are an invalid artifact of the
experimental setup. Alternatively, it could be that the study by Dominik et al. (2017)
has more accurately captured intention reports than traditional Libet studies; perhaps
intention simply occurs more or less at the same time as movement. More specifically,
it could be that the perception of intention occurs around the same as movement. Banks
and Pockett (2007) noted the existence of the intentional binding effect, which makes
intentions seem closer in time to their effects than they actually are. If this effect is at
play in the Libet study, perhaps the experimental setup of Dominik et al. allows
intentions to be reported closer in time to when they are actually perceived. These and
other issues, including other possible interpretations of results, are explored by the
current study. The major aim of the current study was to attempt to replicate the results
of Dominik et al.
Banks and Pockett (2007) also point out the possibility that clock-monitoring
may lead to delays in intention reports due to a memory or perception bias. If the Libetstyle clock naturally leads to inevitably delayed reports of intention, there may be no
way to know, since there is no objective measure of the subjective phenomenon of
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intention. Further, Banks and Pockett (2007, p. 661) note that there may be “systematic
reporting priority” when two events are occurring simultaneously (i.e., monitoring the
clock to make a report and monitoring oneself for intentions). If such an effect is
occurring, there may be no way to know which event is being given monitoring priority
and in which direction this would bias the intention reports. Since the tasks in the Libet
study involve multiple ongoing cognitions and decisions (e.g., inhibit movement and
blinking, wait one rotation before moving, monitor the clock, move spontaneously but
do not preplan, etc.), this effect is likely to be present (see Discussion).
In a review of potential confounding variables in the Libet study, Pockett and
Miller (2006) found a significant difference of about 30ms between movement reports
based on how the report was framed. The report was earlier when participants were told
to report the beginning of a key press rather than the end. Since this study employed a
key press instead of the Libet wrist flexion task, it is possible that such a discrepancy is
larger or smaller in the wrist flexion task. These authors noted that most, if not all,
studies have failed to make such a distinction between start and end of movement. They
conclude that all future studies should give precise instructions about which event to
report, and this study has followed this advice (see Method).
In a review of common criticisms of the Libet study, Banks and Pockett (2007,
p. 659) also noted that although there have been many replications which basically
accord with the original findings of the Libet study, “the numbers are very variable.” In
other words, although most replications have produced similar overall results, there are
considerable differences in data among experiments, among participants, and even
within the same participant. Some participants in the Libet study actually produced
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intention reports that preceded RP onset. Trevena and Miller (2002), as well as Miller et
al. (2011), found that some intention times came after movement. Banks and Pockett
dismissed such variability, arguing that the means and standard deviations found in the
Libet study were too small to reverse the main findings; the interval between the RP and
intention was thought to be too large for this variability to make a difference. However,
recall that the main finding of the Libet study was the temporal relation between the RP
and intention. As we have seen, the late RP is a better index of motor preparation than
the early RP, and it is possible that there is enough variability in the Libet study – as
well as in its variants and replications – to reverse the main findings if one compares the
late RP and intention, since the typically found interval between late RP onset and
intention (200-300ms or less) is much smaller than the interval between RP onset and
intention (350ms or more). This is another reason the current study emphasizes the
relation between the late RP and intention. The importance of examining individual data
will be further discussed later in this section.
Banks and Pockett (2007) also reviewed systematic sources of error and
variability in the Libet study and its replications. One candidate for error is the flash-lag
effect, a well-established visual illusion in which a moving object is misperceived when
compared with a stationary flashing object. In the Libet study, by analogy, the
misperception of the revolving dot might be caused by trying to compare it with one’s
conscious intention to move (i.e., making the intention report). Banks and Pockett note
that the effect could cause errors up to 100ms in either direction, but it is not known if
the effect does in fact occur in the experiment. As before, Banks and Pockett dismiss
the importance of this potential error on the basis of the large interval between the entire
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RP and intention, but this error may be large enough to change the relation between the
late RP and intention. Another potential source of error is the processing time required
to make a visual report using the revolving dot method. Most studies do not address this
issue and simply assume that there is no lag between the dot’s actual position and the
participant’s real-time perception of the dot. However, since it takes about 100ms for
the visual cortex to process visual stimuli, the real-time intention report of the dot may
be 100ms behind where the dot actually is. This means that reports would actually be
closer in time to movement than is perceived. Libet (1985) anticipated this criticism and
cited earlier work in which they claimed to have proven that such perceptual lags are
canceled out by the nature of conscious processing. However, Banks and Pockett (2007,
p. 661) note that this proposed mechanism, subjective back-referral, is not well
accepted. Thus, it is not clear whether there are lags of this sort. This study does not
examine the possibility of the flash lag effect or subjective back referral, but their
possibility must be acknowledged when results are interpreted.
In addition, Banks and Pockett (2007) commented on the use of S (stimulus)
reports by the Libet study. As noted, Libet et al. (1983) measured each participant’s
error when using the clock to report the timing of a stimulus delivered to the back of the
hand and found an overall error rate of 50ms (i.e., the participants reported the stimulus
50ms too early). Consequently, Libet et al. corrected intention reports by making them
50ms later in time. However, Banks and Pockett noted that biases were different among
participants and even varied by day. Further, the Libet study and its replications also
show considerable variation in movement reports, with some coming before or after the
actual movement. It is unclear whether participants are making reliable and stable
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reports, and it is unclear whether errors in reporting are uniform across all types of
reports. Thus, variation among and within participants’ biases in reporting is another
potential error which could enlarge or shorten the temporal interval between the late RP
and intention.
One recent study had a participant whose average intention report preceded RP
onset (Verbaarschot et al., 2015). While this result may have been due to failure to
follow instruction (i.e., failure to make a truly spontaneous movement), this result raises
an important issue. The authors noted that most studies have only examined averages
across all participants and trials, to the neglect of individual results. Thus, although
Libet’s study (Libet et al. 1983) and its replications show a consistent overall effect,
individual participants’ results may contradict the findings. As noted, in the Libet study
and some replications, some intention times were indeed found to precede the RP.
While the study by Verbaarschot et al. (2015) focused on the temporal relation between
the RP and intention, the same conclusions apply to the late RP and intention.
Alongside grand averages, individual averages must also be examined, even individual
trials if possible.
We have already seen that time-locking EEG can create misleading artifacts.
Examining individual data is one way to prevent further artifacts. Importantly, even if
the grand average strongly demonstrates a temporal relation between the late RP and
intention, one or more individual averages may show a violation of the temporal
relation. If that occurs, the supposed temporal relation may be cast into doubt. If that
does not occur, then then confidence in the temporal relation is strengthened. Since the
RP and late RP have both been claimed to reflect the unconscious initiatory processes
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that cause movement, their temporal relation to intention and movement reports must
always hold true. That is, even one indubitable violation of the supposed causal relation
would be enough to invalidate it. Causal relations must hold true 100% of the time, and
the only way to answer the question of causation between the late RP and intention is to
examine both grand and individual averages. Furthermore, outliers should not be easily
dismissed because they do not fit the presumed causal relation. Many studies have
removed outliers from the data or trimmed means on the intention task, assuming they
are incorrect because they stray too far from expected values (Verbaarschot, 2015). Of
course, outliers are usually due to chance, corrupted data, participant errors, etc., but if
they must be removed, the process should be precisely reported and justified, and the
study’s results must be tentatively interpreted. In addition, it should be noted that it has
always been the case temporal succession of events does not necessarily entail causation
(Papanicolaou, 2017). It is one thing to prove that one event precedes another event
(e.g., the RP precedes intention reports), but quite another to prove that the first event
causes the second.
Contradicting evidence regarding the timing of intention reports – as well as
discrepancies in early RP and late RP data – may be the result of individual differences
in participants among studies. This is especially important for studies, including Libet’s
original study, which use a small sample size. Most studies have produced results
showing intention times between approximately 150-200ms prior to movement.
However, a study by Penton, Thierry, and Davis (2014) found an average intention time
of -253ms, and Lau et al. (2004) found an average intention time of -228ms. Such
discrepancies have largely been ignored due to the fact that they were miniscule
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compared to the onset of the RP and thus incapable of reversing the main finding of the
temporal relation between the RP and intention (Banks and Pockett, 2007; Penton et al.,
2014). However, in light of the previously discussed evidence indicating that the late
RP is the appropriate activity to compare to intention, these small differences may
indeed be significant. As noted, based on converging lines of evidence and their own
research, Schurger et al. (2016, p. 79) hypothesized that the actual time of the “neuronal
commitment to move” is about 150-200ms prior to movement, which is clearly in line
with and even later than average intention reports. Clearly, both the late RP and
intention reports require more precise and consistent measurement.
Various individual differences should be explored as potential factors
contributing to the variation in the late RP and intention reports. The study by Penton et
al. (2014) found a relationship between attributional style and intention reports; those
with a more pessimistic style had earlier reports. These authors speculated that earlier
reports, which would lead to longer intervals between intention and movement, might
be associated with individuals perceiving themselves as having less control over their
actions. Factors such as locus of control, inhibitory control, interoceptivity, and timing
of S reports should also be incorporated into analyses. Penton et al. did not find
significant differences in intention reports based on interoceptive sensitivity but did find
this factor to be correlated with attributional style. The current study examined
attributional style but not interoception or other related factors. Future research could
also compare participants’ early and late performance. These analyses would help
illuminate normal and abnormal response patterns. Associations between all these
individual factors and the early RP, late RP, and intention reports should be explored. It
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seems possible that many of these factors might be mediating or moderating variables
which influence intention reports and/or the behavior of the RP and late RP. If
individuals show deviations from the grand averages, these differences should be
explored, and individual factors might illuminate the data. Lastly, there has been
minimal exploration of what the experience of the task is actually like for the
participants. The phenomenology of completing the task, making the decision, and
making reports needs to be qualitatively explored in future research. It seems possible
that multiple phenomenologies of conscious intention and/or agency exist, and they
might be reflected by different intention reports (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, &
Turner, 2004).
Unfortunately, the terminology for the impetus to make the voluntary
movements in the intention and movement tasks, as well as what is to be reported in the
intention task, varies from one study to another. Some examples are “intention,” “urge
to act,” and “sense of intention.” The lack of standardization of terms across studies
seems like a problem, since participants are likely to behave differently depending on
which word is chosen. For example, it seems likely that a person would behave
differently if told to act on an urge instead of told to act on an intention. The
instructions to the participants are somewhat uniform, however; they typically ask
participants to be “spontaneous” and not “pre-plan” any of their acts. Thus, the overall
concept of intention that is usually employed is one of passive reception. Participants
are to allow the urge to act to spontaneously arise. The common, everyday meaning of
conscious intention does not necessarily carry this connotation of passivity
(Papanicolaou, 2017), and it seems likely that participants could easily become
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confused. The validity of intention reports as valid measures of intention, and the
validity of the entire experimental task as measuring a consciously intended movement,
has been called into question. For some, the task is too restrictive to count as a
consciously intended movement, and many questions have been raised about the
ecological validity of the type of movement in the Libet study (Banks and Pockett,
2007; Mele, 2013; Nachev & Hacker, 2014). We will return to these and other questions
in the Discussion.
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II.

Statement of Problem and Hypothesis

The literature review makes it clear that there is much variability in intention
reports, with some research even suggesting that these reports may be an artifact of the
experimental setup (Dominik et al., 2017). The basic question raised by Dominik et al.
is whether the intention reports pioneered by Libet et al. (1983) are valid measures of
intention. The findings and conclusions of the Libet study center on the temporal
relation of the RP and intention. These findings depend on the validity of the RP and
intention reports. If it is shown that the manner in which the Libet study and its
replications have measured intention is invalid, then the findings of the Libet study are
also invalidated. As discussed, participants in the study by Dominik et al., when naïve
about the distinction between moving and intending to move, showed no difference in
reports for movement and intention. The current study centered on replicating the
methodology and results of Dominik et al. (2017). I expected to corroborate the basic
findings of these authors. Specifically, I hypothesized that because participants would
not be induced to make a distinction between moving and intending to move, intention
reports and movements reports would not differ.
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III.

Method

Participants
A power analysis with a desired power level of .90 and an alpha level of .01
revealed that a minimum sample size of 16 participants was required. This power
analysis was based on published data from a variant of the Libet study (Verbaarshot et
al., 2016). The current study aimed to collect data from twice this amount to account for
attrition and data loss. This study collected data from 29 students (7 male) from the
Psychology Department at Eastern Kentucky University. Students ranged in age from
18 to 64 years (M = 22.07). Three students were left-handed. All participants were
recruited using the SONA system and given outside activity credit for their
participation. The study required 1.5 hours of participation. Three credits were given to
those who fully participated. Before beginning the study, a participant was required to
affirm that he/she: (a) was 18 years of age or older, (b) possessed normal or corrected
vision, (c) possessed normal or corrected hearing, (d) was free of any prior or current
neurological, psychological, or sleep disorder, (e) possessed no learning or reading
disability, and (f) was not pregnant.
Seven participants were excluded from analyses after post-hoc examination of
data. Of these, four were excluded due to yielding unanalyzable EMG data, one was
excluded due to having heard of the Libet study (per the PEQ; see below), one was
excluded due to having data accidentally deleted, and one was excluded due to data
being corrupted for an unknown reason. After these exclusions, participants (N = 22; 6
male; 3 left-handed) ranged in age from 18 to 64 years (M = 22.55).
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Materials
Libet Clock and Visual Stimuli. All experiments used visual stimuli presented
in E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, USA). Following the example of recent
research (e.g., Jo et al., 2013; Schmidt et al., 2016), a Libet-style analog clock with a
diameter spanning a visual angle of approximately 3° was presented on a computer
screen (see Figure 5). The clock was identical to that used by Jo et al. (2013), as these
researchers were generous enough share their coded E-Prime file which included a
programmed clock. The visual angle of 3° was approximated with each participant by
standardizing the setup of equipment rather than stabilizing participants’ heads with a
harness. This standardization involved keeping the computer monitor, desk, and chair in
the same position for each participant. The 3° visual angle was achieved by having
participants’ eyes approximately 67cm away from the computer monitor, on which a
3.5cm clock face was presented. The clock hand rotated clockwise with a revolution
period of 2.55 seconds. It was programmed to “rotate” in unison with the 60Hz refresh
rate of the computer monitor (i.e., the next clock tick occurred simultaneously with each
screen refresh). There were 153 tick marks, each one corresponding to about 16.667
milliseconds (i.e., 2.35° of the clock face), which was the maximum temporal resolution
of the clock. All visual stimuli, including the clock and all its parts and on-screen
instructions, were white and presented on a gray background.
Consent Form. The IRB-approved Consent Form (Appendix B) provided an
overview of what the study entailed, and it detailed inclusion criteria, participant rights,
privacy, safeguarding of personal information, and all potential risks to safety and
comfort.
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Figure 5: Enlarged image of the analog clock
used in tasks.

Attributional Style Questionnaire. The Attributional Style Questionnaire
(ASQ; Appendix C) was developed by Peterson et al. (1982). Many versions of the
measure exist, such as the Revised ASQ and the Expanded ASQ (EASQ). However, the
original ASQ continues to be widely used alongside these alternate versions. The
previously discussed study by Penton et al. (2014) employed the original ASQ. The
ASQ examines how individuals perceive and explain life events in terms of internality
(i.e., whether the person or some external factor is responsible), stability (i.e., whether
the cause will continue to exist), and globality (i.e., whether the cause occurs in multiple
life domains). It asked participants to read a description of an event. There were six
positive and six negative events. Participants answered four questions about each event
before proceeding to the next event. First, they wrote down what the major cause of
each event would be if the event happened to them. Then responded to three questions
using a 7-point Likert scale. The first question pertained to internality; it required a
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rating from 1 – 7, with 1 corresponding to “totally due to other people or
circumstances” and 7 corresponding to “totally due to me.” The second question
pertained to stability; it required a rating from 1 – 7, with 1 corresponding to “will never
again be present” and 7 corresponding to “will always be present.” The third question
pertained to globality; it required a rating from 1 – 7, with 1 corresponding to
“influences just this particular situation in my life” and 7 corresponding to “influences
all situations.” The test was analyzed and scored using the method outlined by Penton et
al. (2014), which yielded a composite score and a binary classification of positive or
negative attributional style.
Personal Information Sheet. The Personal Information Sheet (Appendix D)
asked participants to provide basic demographic information. This included sex, age,
and race. In addition, it asked participants to identify their handedness and to indicate
if they were taking any medication or substance which might impair their ability to
focus during the experiment. Instead of asking for a name, it only asked for a SONA
code. No information from the form was used as exclusion criteria. The information
on this form was used to aid in understanding the nature of the data sample.
Post-Experiment Questionnaire. The Post-Experiment Questionnaire (PEQ;
Appendix E) was given to participants at the conclusion of the study. It consisted of a
series of questions about participants’ experiences with and perceptions of the study.
Researchers administered the questionnaire verbally and recorded responses.
Participants were asked to respond to nine yes/no questions and were given the
opportunity to briefly explain their responses. The final question asked them to select
one of three terms to best describe what they reported in the W Task (i.e., intention,
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urge, or impulse) or to provide their own word. Responses to questions were coded
according to the response given (i.e., yes, no, or maybe/unsure). Follow-up explanations
of responses were not coded but were used to provide qualitative information about
participants’ experiences with the study (see Discussion).
Debriefing Form. The Debriefing Form (Appendix F), given to participants
after conclusion of the study, provided an overview of the original study conducted by
Libet et al. (1983). It discussed how the current study attempted to address some of
the criticisms of the Libet study. The form explained to participants how and why
they were assigned to one of two groups (i.e., M-First or W-First) and the purpose of
the tasks they completed. It also explained how data analysis would proceed.
Apparatus for Behavioral and Psychophysiological Data. The recording of
all behavioral data was completed using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.). The recording of all physiological data was completed using
AcqKnoweldge 3.9.1 software (Biopac Systems, Inc.). These software programs ran on
two separate computers, each on an HP ProDesk 600 G2 MT (HP Inc.), but were linked
together for data signaling and collection. A BENQ model RL2455 computer monitor
with a 60Hz refresh rate was used. The monitor was set at a screen resolution of 1280 X
1024. Auditory stimuli were presented with Dell A225 speakers, standardized at 100%
system volume and 50% speaker volume. A Logitech M100 USB mouse was used on
all tasks. Tests revealed that the mouse had a maximum polling rate of 125 Hz (i.e.,
maximum temporal resolution of 8ms) on the computer.
Electromyography (EMG) data were collected and analyzed via a Biopac
MP100A recording system (Biopac Systems, Inc.). On this system EEG100C amplifiers
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were used, with a gain of 20,000, a 35 Hz LPN (low pass notch) filter, and .1 Hz HP
(high pass) filter. For EMG recording two Biopac EL258 Ag-AgCl (silver-silver
chloride) unshielded electrodes with holes were used. Impedance of electrodes was
checked using a UFI 1089 Checktrode MKIII (UFI). Following standard procedures, the
satisfactory impedance level for electrodes was 5 KΩ or below.
Prior to running participants EMG pilot testing was conducted, in which EMG
signal clarity was assessed at various locations on the hand, wrist, and fingers. These
tests revealed that optimal EMG could be obtained using one electrode behind the
trapezoid bone (i.e., lowest knuckle) of the right index finger and one electrode on the
ventral forearm of the right arm, just below the wrist (see Figure 6). The EMG signal
was used to objectively measure when the participants’ finger movement began during a
mouse click. The mouse click initiates a digital trigger in the software programs, but
this trigger is inevitably delayed in time past the earliest moment of movement, since
completing the press of a mouse button necessarily takes more time to execute than
simply initiating the first movement to press the button. The EMG signal was used to
correct the digitally recorded triggers for mouse clicks (see Data Analysis). This was a
crucial aspect of the study, as it was essential to know with precision the moment
participants’ movements began (see EMG subsection of Discussion).
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Figure 6: Standardized placement of EMG electrodes.

Tasks
Participants completed three distinct tasks. All tasks consisted of training trials,
regular trials, and a 60 second break after half of the regular trials were completed. All
tasks used a Libet-style clock. This clock consisted of a clock face with a hand rotating
clockwise at a revolution period of 2.55 seconds (see Materials for a detailed
description). Participants viewed this clock in order to note the location of the clock
hand when a certain event occurred. The event depended on which task they were
completing (see the specific task descriptions below). Participants noted the position of
the clock hand at the time of a certain event and then later reported this position. They
reported this position on a screen on which the clock face, but not the clock hand, was
present. Participants simply clicked on the clock face to indicate where the clock hand
was when the event occurred (see Figure 7 for an example of a report screen).
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Figure 7: Report screen from the W Task.

When the clock was first presented during a trial, the clock face appeared for a
random interval of 1000-2000 milliseconds before the clock hand appeared and started
rotating. The clock hand could begin rotating from any position on the clock. A mouse
click was required in order to stop the clock hand rotation. After this click, the rotation
continued for a random interval of 1000-2000 milliseconds. On the next screen,
participants clicked on the clock face to make the report of the event in question. As
noted, Libet et al. (1983) found no difference in recall modes, and since most
replications use only the absolute recall mode (i.e., reporting the actual perceived
position of the clock hand), the current study employed only this recall mode (see
Introduction).
S Task. Participants waited to hear a tone (a standard beep of 100ms duration)
played through the speakers while viewing the clock. The beep was played at a random
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time during the 2.5-7.5 second interval after the clock hand appeared (Jo et al., 2013).
They were to then click the mouse any time after they heard the tone in order to stop the
rotation and bring up the report screen. Participants were asked to report where the
clock hand was at the moment they first heard the beep.
M Task. Participants were asked to make a spontaneous voluntary movement –
a mouse click – at the time of their choosing. Following standard procedure, they were,
however, instructed to wait for the clock hand to make one full rotation from its starting
point before moving, so that an EMG baseline could be calculated during data analysis
(e.g., Jo et al., 2013). Researchers emphasized to participants that the mouse clicks
needed to be spontaneous and not preplanned. Following the click, participants were
asked to report where the clock hand was at the moment they first initiated their hand
movement to click the mouse. This was done in accordance with the findings of Pockett
and Miller (2006), which, as discussed, showed a significant difference in reports of
movement depending on whether the beginning or the end of a movement was
emphasized.
W Task. This task was identical to the M task in all aspects but one. Instead of
reporting the moment of movement initiation, participants reported the moment they
first had the intention to move. Because the aforementioned findings of Pockett and
Miller (2006) seem extendable from movement reports to intention reports, researchers
emphasized that these reports indicate the earliest moment of the intention to move.
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Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were asked to provide their unique SONA code for
identification purposes. They were then brought into the participant room. Researchers
first discussed the consent process with participants, providing them with an overview
of all the information on the consent form and allowing participants to take as much
time as needed to read the consent form. Once participants had finished reading, the
researchers allowed them to ask questions. They then asked them to provide consent by
signing the form. Researchers then asked participants to complete the Personal
Information Sheet and the ASQ. Once those were completed, researchers connected
participants to the EMG equipment. All tasks required moving and pressing the left
button of a standard computer mouse. Though participants’ handedness was determined
prior to completion of tasks, all participants were required to use a right-handed mouse,
so all EMG connections were to the right hand and arm (see Materials). Before giving
instructions for the first task, researchers ensured that the chair, table, and computer
monitor were in their standardized positions to approximate the correct distance from
the participants’ eyes to the screen, in order to achieve the correct visual angle for the
clock. The overhead lights in the room were turned off for all participants unless they
requested that they remain on. The speakers and computer system volume were checked
to ensure they were at standardized levels.
Refer to Figure 8 for a visual representation of the flow of task completion. All
participants completed the same three computer tasks (i.e., the S Task, M Task, and W
Task), but the order of task completion differed between groups. All participants
completed the S Task first, but participants differed in the order in which they
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Figure 8: Task order by group.
M-First: Group in which the M Task was completed prior to the W Task
W-First: Group in which the W Task was completed prior to the M Task
S Task: Report of onset of stimulus (tone)
M Task: Spontaneous mouse click, then report of movement
W Task: Spontaneous mouse click, then report of intention

completed the M Task and W Task. Prior to arrival, participants had been randomly
assigned to one of two groups, the M-First group or the W-First group. Aside from the
difference in order of task completion, the two groups underwent the experiment
identically. The M-First group completed the M Task prior to the W Task, and the WFirst group completed the W Task prior to the M Task.
Prior to initiating the S Task, researchers gave participants general information,
rules and instructions for the clock. Participants were informed that the clock hand
could start in any random position. They were instructed to fixate their eyes on the
center of the clock and note the clock hand position rather than following the clock
hand with their eyes or using some other strategy to determine its position. They were
also instructed to minimize blinking and moving during trials. Participants were told
they could move at their own pace through trials and, thus, could blink and move after
individual trials were completed (before clicking to initiate the next trial). All these
instructions were given in order to minimize any potential interference with
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participants’ ability to complete the tasks and interference with the EMG recording
itself, which is extremely sensitive to movement.
Participants were informed that they would first complete training trials with the
researchers present and then complete regular trials once the researchers had left the
room. Researchers ensured that participants had appeared to understand the task before
leaving the participant room, as evidenced by performance on training trials. After one
task was complete (i.e., all regular trials were complete), researchers returned to the
room to access the next task on the computer and provide instructions. This allowed the
participants to take a short 1-2 minute break from completing tasks.
The S Task consisted of five training trials and 30 regular trials. Participants
were allowed to move at their own pace once a trial was complete; they had to click
after a trial ended before the next trial would begin. They were instructed to monitor the
clock hand while waiting to hear the beep, and they were instructed to simply click
sometime after they heard the beep in order to end the clock rotation. Researchers
emphasized that the task was not about reaction time to the beep (i.e., how quickly they
clicked after the beep was not important) and that the report of the clock hand was the
key aspect of the task (see Appendix G for the on-screen instructions presented for the S
Task).
After completion of the S Task, participants completed either the M Task or W
Task, which consisted of 5 training trials and 60 regular trials. Crucially, participants
were not given any indication that there would be a separate event to report in their third
task when completing this second task. That is, participants were simply given
instructions to make a spontaneous voluntary movement (i.e., a mouse click at any time
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after the clock had made one rotation; see Tasks subsection of Method) and, depending
on group, told to report either the moment they initiated their movement or the moment
they had the intention to move. Those in the M-First group, completing the M Task,
were not told about the possibility of making an intention report, and those in the WFirst group, completing the W Task, were not told about the possibility of making a
movement report. Researchers were deliberate in not sharing this information with
participants, and the language used mirrored that of Dominik et al. (2017). Even the title
of the study, which was printed on forms given to participants, was changed to avoid
any possible influence. The study was originally named “Conscious Intention and Free
Will: A Hybrid Replication of the Libet Study,” but it was changed to “Volition and the
Readiness Potential” so that the word “intention” would not appear on forms given to
participants.
Given the lack of agreement concerning the term used to describe the impetus to
make a voluntary movement, as well as what is reported in the W Task, researchers
deliberately used both the words “urge” and “intention” when giving instructions to
participants. Specifically, researchers used both words when verbally describing the
spontaneous click to be made in both the M Task and W Task, as well as the report to
be made in the W Task. Researchers used the phrase “report where the clock hand was
when you first had the intention, or urge, to click.” In addition, the on-screen
instructions for both tasks asked participants to “click when the urge arises,” and the
instructions for the W Task asked participants to “report the time when you first had the
intention to click” (see Appendices H and I for the instructions presented on screen to
participants for the M Task and W Task, respectively).
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As noted (see Tasks subsection of Method), researchers emphasized that
participants make a spontaneous, unplanned mouse click. After all trials were complete,
participants were prompted with a question about preplanning: “Did you preplan any of
your movements during the regular trials you just completed?” (see Appendix J for a
script of the preplanning question presented for the W Task; the question was identical
for each task, aside from changing to denote the total number of regular trials
completed). Participants were to respond by estimating how many trials they
preplanned.
Participants then completed the third task (i.e., either the M Task or W Task,
depending on group). Researchers emphasized that the task was identical to the one just
completed except that the current one required a different kind of report. Researchers
again required participants to complete five training trials before proceeding to
complete the 60 regular trials. Participants were prompted with a preplanning question
at the end of the third task as well. After this task, researchers reentered the room,
unconnected the EMG electrodes, and informed participants that the study had ended
for the day.
Participants returned for a second day of the study (see Future Analyses
subsection of Discussion for an overview of this second part of the study). At the end of
the second day, they completed the PEQ, which is included in the analyses of the
current study. They were also given the Debriefing Form at the end of the second day.
Data Analysis
ASQ. Responses to the ASQ were collected, but they are not appropriate for
comparison to W Task results from the current study. Penton et al. (2014) compared
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attributional style with performance on the W Task in a normal Libet-style study. As we
have seen, the crux of this study is that it departs from the normal Libet study setup, in
that participants are not trained to distinguish between movement and intention reports
and are in one of two groups which differ in order of task completion. Thus, analyses on
the ASQ were not conducted for this study. As noted, participants returned for a second
day after completing the current study. Analyses will be conducted to compare the ASQ
to these results (see Future Analyses subsection of Discussion).
S Task. Individual averages and standard deviations for the S Task are
presented in Appendix K1. The purpose of the S Task was to determine participants’
average error in using the analog clock to make reports of events (Libet et al., 1983).
Libet et al. used the average error of an individuals’ S Task reports (i.e., report of the
onset of an external stimulus compared to its objective onset) to correct all reports made
by participants in all tasks. The current study intended to follow this methodology, but
due to the extreme variability in within-subjects results on the task, we decided to not
use S Task results to correct other reports. This variability was present even when
reports equal to or greater a clock quadrant (i.e., three clock numbers, or approximately
638ms) were treated as outliers and removed from the data. Standard deviations, after
outliers were removed, ranged from 38 to 215 milliseconds (M = 93). The variability
within participants’ reports was likely due to a combination of the small quantity of
trials collected (30) and the inherent imprecision of using a small analog clock to make
reports (see Materials for a detailed description of the clock and Limitations for
criticism of the clock). We decided it was optimal to allow this variability to remain in
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All tables of results are presented in appendices.
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the reports of the other tasks; this seemed preferable to correcting all reports by an
average error amount with a large standard deviation amount, calculated from 30 trials.
Furthermore, Dominik et al. (2017) did not collect data on the S Task, so using S Task
results to correct the M Task and W Task would have been a departure from the study
whose methodology we aimed to replicate as much as possible.
EMG. As discussed, EMG data were collected in order to determine the
objective time that hand movement began when participants made their spontaneous
mouse clicks. Researchers visually inspected and corrected digital triggers on all trials
for all tasks other than the S Task (wherein the objective time of the mouse click was
unimportant because the objective event in question was the tone) so that they would
indicate the objective time that movement began. Note that it was not important to
know the objective time of other mouse clicks made by participants during tasks (e.g.,
clicks on the clock face to make reports), so EMG corrections were not made for these
clicks. The onset of EMG was determined by visual inspection of individual trials; the
variability in data within and among participants prevented development of a
standardized measure for determining onset. The criterion for determining onset was a
significant departure from the preceding baseline of activity. In particular, researchers
looked for either an uptick or downtick in activity that led to a prolonged departure
from baseline all the way up to and past the time of the digital trigger. See Figure 9 for
an example of EMG activity compared to a trigger. In data files, researchers replaced
the timestamp of the digital triggers with the timestamp indicated by the onset of EMG
activity. For descriptive purposes, each participants’ average EMG correction for the M
Task and W Task was calculated (Appendix L). Visual inspection of EMG data
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Figure 9: Screenshot of EMG onset (top pane) compared to digital trigger
(bottom pane).
On this trial, EMG activity begins about 128 milliseconds prior to the trigger.

revealed that nearly all EMG onset times occurred between 70-200ms prior to the
triggers. The very small quantity of trials with EMG times outside this range was
excluded from data analysis. That is, these trials were not included in calculations for
the M Task and W Task. In addition, those trials in which it was unclear when EMG
activity began (e.g., a noisy signal or appearance of multiple clicks) were also excluded
from data analysis. Analyses showed that EMG corrections averaged -130 milliseconds
(SD = 29) for the M task and -133 milliseconds (SD = 30) for the W Task.
The crucial aspect of the M Task and the W Task is the report made by
participants. In each task, data analysis centers on comparing the report to movement
onset as objectively determined by EMG onset. Calculations were set up such that
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movement onset time was subtracted from the report time. In this way, positive
numbers reflected late reports, and negative numbers yielded early reports. For
example, if a movement occurred 1000ms after a trial began and the participant reported
that the movement occurred at 1200ms, the difference of objective movement time
minus report time is 200ms, indicating a report that was 200ms too late.
During data analysis, actual comparisons between movement times and reported
times were carried out using clock time (i.e., numbers between 1-12) before they were
converted to milliseconds. Recall that participants made reports by clicking on the clock
face to indicate the clock hand’s position when an event occurred. These reports were
stored as clock time with precision of three decimal places. For example, a participant
clicking on the clock face halfway between 3 and 4 would yield a reported clock hand
position of 3.500. The digital triggers corresponding to mouse clicks were also stored as
clock time, so a mouse click occurring when the clock hand was at 6 would be stored as
6.000. These triggers, as previously discussed, were manually corrected with EMG data.
Once corrections were made, movement times were subtracted from reports and then
converted from clock time into milliseconds. Those trials on which there was
discrepancy of 1000ms or more (i.e., approximately 4.71 units of clock time) between
report and movement time were treated as outliers and removed from the data.
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IV.

Results

Participant, group, and grand average means for the M Task and W Task are
presented in Appendix M. A 2X2 Mixed Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
conducted in order to determine if there was an interaction effect of group and task. As
discussed, there were two groups, M-First (n = 10; 2 males; average age 20.3 years) and
W-First (n = 12; 4 males; average age 24.42 years) and two tasks, the M Task and W
Task.
The results of the ANOVA indicated a significant interaction of group and task,
F (1, 970) = 89.571, p < .001, η2𝑝 = .085. Group membership affected participants’
performance on the tasks. There was also a main effect of group, F (1, 970) = 15.401, p
< .001, η2𝑝 = .016 and a main effect of task, F (1, 970) = 21.768, p <.001, η2𝑝 = .022.
Pairwise comparisons were conducted within the ANOVA via analyses of
simple effects. Figure 10 contains a graph of the means and standard errors used in the
pairwise comparisons between groups. Means were significantly different on all
comparisons except the most crucial one: there was no difference between groups on
the second task completed (i.e., the first task after the S Task). That is, there was no
difference in reports on the M Task of the M-First group (M = .114ms) and the W Task
of the W-First group (M = .108ms).
Turning now to the other pairwise comparisons, on the M Task, the W-First
group (M = .066ms) made significantly earlier reports compared to the M-First group
(M = .114ms). On the W Task, the M-First group (M = -.011ms) made significantly
earlier reports compared to the W-First group (M = .108ms). Regarding the third task
completed, the W Task reports made by the M-First group (M = -.011ms) were
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significantly earlier than the M Task reports made by the W-First group (M = .066ms).
The only possible within-groups comparison, between the M Task and W Task, was
significant. In both groups the third task completed was reported significantly earlier
than the second task. In the M-First group, reports were significantly earlier for the W
Task (M = -.011ms) than the M Task (M = .114ms). In the W-First group, reports were
significantly earlier for the M Task (M = .066ms) than the W Task (M = .108ms). In
other words, regardless of whether participants first made intention or movement
reports, they then reported the other event as occurring earlier in time.

Figure 10: Line graph comparing performance on tasks.
The M-First group completed the M Task as “second task” and the W Task as “third task” and the WFirst group completed the W Task as “second task” and the M Task as “third task.” There was no
difference between groups on the second task.
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The same analyses were conducted on a dataset without EMG corrections in
order to determine whether the corrections changed results. This dataset used the digital
triggers as they were and did not take into account any EMG data. The results of the
ANOVA indicated a significant interaction of group and task, F (1, 1278) = 95.585, p <
.001, η2𝑝 = .070. There was a main effect of group, F (1, 1278) = 21.589, p < .001, η2𝑝 =
.017 and a main effect of task, F (1, 1278) = 21.469, p <.001, η2𝑝 = .007. Though means,
p-values, and effect sizes inevitably varied slightly, all findings of significance and nonsignificance were identical to the EMG-corrected dataset, both for the ANOVA and the
analyses of simple effects (see above). See Appendix N for participant, group, and
grand average means for the M Task and W Task on this dataset.
Individual Chi-Square Tests of Independence comparing the M-First and WFirst groups on responses to the PEQ were not significant for any of the 10 questions
(see Appendix O for these results). However, Question 5 (Did you feel there was a gap
in time between your intentions and your movements?), Question 6 (Did you always
feel an intention to move before you moved?), Question 8 (Did you tend to make your
clicks at similar places?), and Question 10 (Which word best describes what you
reported in W tasks: intention, urge, impulse, or some other word?) are of note. These
questions deal with the construct of intention in the study and/or the study’s
methodology the study, and there appeared to be no clear consensus among
participants’ responses.
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V.

Discussion

The major aim of the current study was to replicate the results of Dominik et al.
(2017), which showed that there was no difference in movement reports and intention
reports when participants were not trained to make an a priori distinction between
moving and intending to move. I hypothesized that I would corroborate the basic
findings of Dominik et al., and the results of the current study supported this hypothesis.
Prior to being made to distinguish between moving and intending to move, one group
reported the time of intention and one group reported the time of movement. These
reports were not significantly different between groups. This calls into question the
validity of the intention reports made in the Libet study.
The results of the ANOVA indicated that performance on the M Task and W
Task depended on group membership. Recall that group membership determined the
order in which the M Task and W Task were completed. Therefore, the significance of
the ANOVA indicates a significant order effect of task completion. The analyses of
simple effects were significant for all possible comparisons but one: means did not
significantly differ between the M Task in the M-First group and the W Task in the WFirst group (see Figure 10). Crucially, there was no significant difference in these
reports, despite the fact that each group was completing a different task with its own
particular instructions. In the Libet study (Libet et al., 1983) these reports differed by
over 100ms (i.e., M Task reports around -40ms and W Task reports around -150ms).
Recall that in the current study this comparison was between the second task completed
in each group (the task following the S Task; see Method and Figure 8). When given
instructions for this second task, participants were instructed to make a spontaneous
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click and told to either report their movement (M Task) or intention/urge (W Task).
Researchers were careful to not inform participants of the existence the third task and its
other type of report.
Note that on these reports the groups’ grand average means for the EMGcorrected dataset were around 110 milliseconds, while their grand average means for
EMG-uncorrected dataset were around -15 milliseconds (see Appendices M and N,
respectively). The former indicates late reports relative to the objective time of
movement, and the latter indicates early reports. Recall that Dominik et al. (2017) found
grand average means around -10ms on this comparison. Thus, though the current study
and Dominik et al. (2017) agree in terms of group means not differing significantly on
the crucial comparison, the grand average means between studies appear to differ by
over 100ms when the EMG-corrected dataset is used. When the EMG-uncorrected
dataset is used, the means between studies are comparable (i.e., -10ms versus -15ms).
This dataset likely shows agreement with that of Dominik et al. because these authors
only reported EMG-uncorrected data. It appears that Dominik et al. accepted the digital
triggers of key presses as accurate and did not use EMG data to correct the digital
triggers initiated by the key presses of participants. Dominik et al. do not report the use
of EMG or other data to determine the objective onset of movement. The EMGcorrected dataset of the current study corrected all digital triggers via EMG data (see
Data Analysis subsection of Method). Both datasets in the current study agree with the
findings of significance of Dominik et al., but only the EMG-uncorrected dataset, which
matches those authors’ methodology, also shows comparable grand average means.
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Note that the EMG-corrected dataset is the focus of the following discussion unless
otherwise noted.
The between-subjects comparisons that were significant showed that groups did
differ in performance on the M Task, as well as the W Task, and that there was a
difference between groups in the third task completed (i.e., the W Task in the M-First
group and the M Task in the W-First group). These results strengthen confidence in the
sole nonsignificant difference between groups (i.e., between the M Task in the M-First
group and the W Task in the W-First group), though it should be emphasized that a
finding of nonsignificance does not indicate that two groups are identical but, rather,
that there is no evidence that the two are different.
These findings can be interpreted in two main ways. Recall that the study by
Dominik et al. (2017), whose basic results I have replicated, is centered on the validity
of intention reports in the Libet study. The basic question is whether intention reports
actually reflect an experience of intention, and whether they do so accurately. Put
another way, the most fundamental question about the validity of intention reports is
whether or not intention itself is actually present in the spontaneous voluntary
movements carried out in the M Task and W Task. The answer to that question dictates
whether or not another question is asked. If one holds that intention is not present in the
voluntary movements, then one must conclude that intention reports in the Libet study
are invalid, and no further questions are needed. If one holds that intention is present in
the voluntary movements, then the question becomes whether intention reports
accurately capture intention. There are multiple ways of answering this question, as
well. I will discuss these issues by examining them in terms of the two possible main
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interpretations of the current study’s findings regarding the presence of intention in the
tasks. Then I will look at the larger picture of what these findings, and the Libet study,
might tell us about intention in general.
Interpretation 1: Intention is not present during the tasks. On one hand,
results appear to indicate that individuals do not make a natural distinction between the
experiences of moving and intending to move, at least for simple movements like those
carried out in this study. In the traditional Libet study, researchers may be implicitly
inducing (i.e., creating) this distinction. Libet et al. (1983) appear to take the distinction
for granted. Assuming two phenomenally distinct events of intention and movement,
Libet et al. trained participants extensively on all tasks from the beginning, and
replications have followed suit. This may have led to demand characteristics in results
on the M Task and W Task in all versions of the Libet study which made the seemingly
innocent distinction between moving and intending to move. Participants may have
implicitly or explicitly forced themselves to make this distinction, despite uncertainty or
personal experience to the contrary. Other researchers have provided evidence or argued
that individuals may infer intention in the Libet study (Haggard & Clark, 2003; Banks
& Isham, 2009; Pockett & Purdy, 2011).
It may be that individuals do not naturally make such a distinction because
“intention” is not phenomenally experienced in the tasks. Dominik et al. (2017) argue
that there is only one event that occurs during the Libet task, that of movement. This is
why participants, when allowed to make reports reflecting their natural phenomenology,
make intention reports indistinguishable from movement reports, both of which are near
the objective time of movement. Compare this to the results of Libet et al. (1983), in
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which there was a difference of over 100ms between movement and intention reports,
and only movement reports occurred near the objective time of movement. Recall that
the results of Dominik et al. showed both reports near 10ms prior to movement, which
is why these authors could argue that both reports were near the time of movement.
Both reports in the current study were around 110ms post-movement, which was a
departure from the results of Dominik et al. However, these authors did not correct their
data with EMG, while the current study did (see above). The current study’s results
from the dataset uncorrected by EMG were comparable to the reports from Dominik et
al.: both reports were around 15ms prior to movement (Appendix N). The EMGcorrected data of the current study appear to show that both reports are made late in
time relative to movement onset. This may appear to weaken the original interpretation
of Dominik et al. that movement is the single event being reported, since the reports are
far removed in time from movement. This is not the case, of course, because the M
Task reports were also far removed in time from movement; both reports were around
110ms post-movement. The methodology of the current study simply captured the
objective time of movement onset differently than Dominik et al., and perhaps
differently than many other studies, necessarily shifting both types of reports later in
time (see EMG subsections of Method and Discussion). Thus, the results of the current
study support the argument of Dominik et al. that only one event is being reported in the
tasks: movement.
Dominik et al. (2017, p. 260) argue that the difference in M Task reports and W
Task reports in the traditional Libet study results may occur because intention reports
are an “artificially induced impression” produced by “mere experience with M [Task]

63

measurements.” Dominik et al. call this “anchoring” and note that participants likely
report intentions before movements because intentions logically precede execution of
movement. That is, the clearly experienced phenomenon of movement may serve as an
objective reference point. In the absence of a genuine experience of an intention,
intention may be cognitively inferred as logically occurring prior to the objectively
anchored time of movement.
The results for the third task completed in the current study, which partially
conform to the findings of Dominik et al. (2017), are further evidence of this anchoring
effect. Recall that participants in both groups made earlier reports on their third task
than their second task. However, the event in the third task was reported significantly
earlier in the M-First group (i.e., W Task; M = -.011ms) than in the W-First group (i.e.,
M Task; M = .066ms) (see Results). The results of Dominik et al. (2017, p. 260)
showed the same pattern, with a difference between groups of 234 milliseconds.
Dominik et al. also found a significant within-groups difference between tasks in their
M-First group, whereas this difference was not significant in their W-First group. They
argued that these results indicated an anchoring effect in the M-First group but not the
W-First group. In other words, those who first completed the M Task had their
experience with movement reports to anchor their W Task reports. They could then
cognitively infer that intention should precede the times they reported on the M Task.
(Note that the methodology for the M-First group mirrors what normally occurs in the
Libet study, both in terms of methodology and results. Participants make intention
reports only after becoming familiar with movement reports, and intention is reported
significantly earlier in time than movement). Those who first completed the W Task, on
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the other hand, were unaware of the movement/intention distinction when making
intention reports and, consequently, made them close in time to movement. The results
of Dominik et al. showed that M Task reports in this group were not significantly
different than W Task reports, so we are left to assume that in both tasks participants
reported the time of movement.
However, the current study’s results depart from Dominik et al. here, in that the
difference in means between the W Task and M Task in the W-First group was
significant. As noted, in both groups reports on the third task were earlier than those on
the second. The means of Dominik et al. showed the same pattern, but the difference
failed to reach significance. It seems counterintuitive that the W-First group would
report movements before intentions. Perhaps some sort of anchoring effect is inevitable
in the setup of studies like the current one, regardless of the type of report first made.
Alternatively, perhaps at least some of the difference between the first report and the
second report is due to differences in motivation and arousal. By the time participants
reach the final task, they have completed numerous trials of an extremely taxing yet
boring task (see Limitations). Perhaps this influences performance on the third task,
including one’s cognitions about making reports. Regardless of the reason for this
discrepancy between studies, the current study does corroborate the most important
evidence of Dominik et al. regarding the anchoring effect: there was no difference
between reports on the second task, and intention reports were made significantly
earlier in time when completed after the M Task.
Why might intention be absent from the movements carried out in the Libet
study? As noted in the introduction, many questions have been raised about the
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ecological validity of the movements. It seems plausible that the movements are too
simple or artificial to actually involve “intention” as commonly experienced. The
movements are voluntarily initiated, but they seem to be so stripped of purpose and
context that they involve no deliberation and decision-making (i.e., intention). Indeed,
participants are told to simply move “spontaneously” without preplanning, which seems
to preclude the possibility of intentional deliberation. It is worth asking whether
“intention” can be phenomenally present in such movements. Indeed, it may be a
paradox to “intend” a movement while simultaneously acting “spontaneously” without
preplanning. Is the Libet study trying to measure intention despite instructing
individuals to move without intention? This would accord with the skepticism voiced by
Nachev and Hacker (2014) that the Libet study makes the implicit, yet unproven,
assumption that a conscious intention always precedes a spontaneous voluntary
movement.
Papanicolaou (2017, p. 314) discusses the distinction between acts and mere
movements. Acts are intentional in that they are carried out for some meaningful goal or
purpose, while mere movements are not. What is asked of participants in the Libet
study, for Papanicolaou, is not an act but a mere movement, with no consequence or
significance other than in the minimum sense of continuing a research study. The mere
movements of the Libet study, in a decontextualized experimental setting, can give the
false appearance of being meaningful acts because some acts involve similar
movements. After all, to act one must usually move in some way. Papanicolaou gives
the example of pressing a button to vote or buy stocks. In these cases, moving to press a
button is accompanied by a host of mental processes, such as those for planning,
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deliberation, judgment, attention, impulse control, and the like. In the Libet study, there
is a movement to press a button, but is not supposed to involve such mental processes.
One is supposed to simply move spontaneously, and one’s mental processes are to be
focused on following the rules for using the clock to make reports. In short, the Libet
study is designed to produce extremely simple, nearly meaningless movements rather
than acts, and these mere movements may be devoid of intention. It may be impossible
to capture intention in a task that is deliberately designed to be simple and basically
purposeless.
The movements in the Libet study, whether they be mouse clicks, wrist flexes,
or some variation thereof, are certainly voluntary, but perhaps only in the most minimal
sense. The term “voluntary” seems to entail intention, but the results of the current
study suggest that all voluntary movements are not necessarily intentional. Many
authors have pointed out that in the Libet study the only “decision” to be made is about
when to act, which is supposed to occur without prior planning or deliberation (e.g.,
Haggard, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2016; Papanicolaou, 2017). The decision to act is
already made when the participant begins individual trials; by understanding
instructions and agreeing to complete blocks of trials, the participant has already
decided that and how he/she will move, and the only question is when to move. At best,
the M Task and W Task are when-decisions (Haggard, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2016).
These decisions seem very different from everyday decisions associated with voluntary
acts of will. Intention may simply be absent in when-decisions, or at least in those made
in a decontextualized, sterile experimental environment like the Libet study setup. This
apparent lack of ecological validity was one reason for skepticism from many authors
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about the attempts to extrapolate from the Libet study to everyday life (e.g., Banks and
Pockett, 2007; Mele, 2013; Nachev & Hacker, 2014; Navon, 2014; Kihlstrom, 2017;
Papanicolaou, 2017). For this reason, and others, many authors were not ready to
interpret Libet’s findings as evidence against “free will” (see Philosophical Issues
subsection for more discussion of free will).
Lastly, it is worth noting that some authors have argued that there is not a
positive phenomenology associated with agency (Chadha, 2016). On this view, there is
no “agentive” feeling that accompanies voluntary movements or acts; one simply moves
or acts voluntarily. Chadha (2016, p. 203) notes that there is a phenomenological feeling
of the loss of authorship of one’s actions in cases of abnormal agency, such as “alien
control” in schizophrenia. However, this does not entail that there was originally a
feeling of normal agency that was lost or replaced. Simply put, Chadha argues that one
only experiences a feeling associated with agency if something goes awry during the
process of agency. If all goes well, there is no salient feeling that one is the author of
one’s actions; one simply is the author of one’s actions. This account might explain why
movements in the Libet study may be voluntary yet devoid of reportable intention.
Whatever the reasons might be for the absence of intention in the spontaneous
voluntary movements carried out in the Libet study, this interpretation of results is a
deadly blow to the basic conclusions of the Libet study. If one interprets the findings of
the current study and those of Dominik et al. as indicating that intention is not present,
then intention reports in the Libet study, as well as in all its replications, are invalidated.
The crux of the Libet study is the comparison of the RP to intention via intention
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reports. If intention reports are invalidated, then the findings regarding the temporal
relation of the RP and intention are also invalidated and must be discarded.
Interpretation 2: Intention is present during the tasks. This interpretation
avoids the categorical invalidation of intention reports that necessarily followed from
the interpretation that intention was not present during the tasks. On this view, intention
is present in the tasks, occurring as a distinct event. In general, as we shall see, this is a
more skeptical interpretation of the current study’s results. There are three versions of
this interpretation. The first version interprets the results of the current study and those
of Dominik et al. (2017) as indicating that intention occurs at the same time as
movement. The second version holds that intention reports in the Libet study and its
replications are accurate and that there is some flaw in the current study and that of
Dominik et al. The third version holds that intention is present but inevitably
misreported. I will examine each of these in turn.
First, it may be that the results of the current study and of Dominik et al. (2017)
reflect accurate reports for the W Task. Perhaps intention is present in the tasks but
misreported in traditional Libet study. That is, it is possible that the commonly induced
distinction between movement and intention leads to inaccurate intention reports, and
only the current study and that of Dominik et al., which did not force such a distinction
on the second task completed, accurately captured intention reports on the second task
(i.e., intention occurs around the same time as movement). It seems far from
implausible that in spontaneous voluntary movements, intention could more or less
coincide with movement. Indeed, feedback from the PEQ strongly suggests that many
individuals may have experienced intention in this way. Many reported that there was
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no gap between intentions and movements. Some were unsure if there was a gap. For
example, one noted that both reports “might be the same moment in time.” If this is
indeed true, studies must find a way to avoid interfering with the natural
phenomenology of the experience of moving itself in order to accurately capture
intention. The current study provides one example, but future research might attempt
other approaches. For example, participants might be told about the M Task and W
Task and the concept of “movement” versus “intention” from the beginning, but they
could be provided clear instructions that there are no “right” reports and that they could
report the two events as occurring in any temporal order or as coinciding in time.
Second, it is possible that intention is present and the Libet study has accurately
captured intention reports all along. On this view, there must be some methodological
flaw(s) in the current study and the study of Dominik et al. giving rise to their unique
findings. Critics of the current study might point to the experimental setup in which
participants were given minimal instructions, for example (see Limitations for a review
of potential issues with the current study). Thus, this interpretation disregards the
findings of the current study and accepts the standard findings of the Libet study.
Third, it is possible that intention is present in the task but is affected by any and
all attempts to report (i.e., measure) it. Consequently, it may be impossible to capture
accurate reports of intention. Furthermore, even if it were possible to capture accurate
reports, it might be impossible to verify that a study has done so. In short, this
interpretation of results grants the presence of intention in the tasks but questions the
validity of all intention reports, including those in the current study. For one, intention,
like other psychological phenomena, is likely to be affected by the attention focused
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upon it. A form of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (HUP) appears to be at play
here, in which attempts to introspectively examine (i.e., become conscious of and report
on) an ongoing mental process necessarily change the process. (I must credit Miller,
Shepherdson, and Trevena (2011) with first applying the HUP to the Libet study. They
discussed the HUP in relation to the influence of the clock on the RP, pointing out how
clock monitoring is necessary for reports yet may change, or even cause, the RP).
To use Heideggerian language, intention may be inextricable with one’s
purposive engagement with the world, and it may be impossible to accurately abstract
about the occurrent features of intentional engagement (Käufer & Chemero, 2015, pp.
50-76). In other words, it is one thing to engage intentionally, but another to try to
introspect during the process of ongoing intentional engagement and then attempt to
divulge meaningful information from these abstractions. Just as one cannot know the
location of a particle without changing it (e.g., bouncing a photon off the particle
inevitably changes its position and momentum), one may not be able to observe and/or
report on one’s intention without changing its phenomenology, such as the perception
of its onset. As Wasserman (1985) argued, the act of reporting a conscious intention is
itself an additional voluntary act. Surely the insertion of additional variables into one’s
phenomenology has some sort of effect.
These additional variables add up to a considerable cognitive load for
participants during tasks, one which has likely been underestimated. The tasks, despite
consisting of only a few simple overt components, are attentionally demanding.
Participants are asked to comply with a litany of rules and requests, both overarching
ones for the entire study and particular ones for individual tasks. Refer to Figure 11 for
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a visual representation of some of the variables contributing to cognitive load during the
M Task or W Task. For example, during trials participants must refrain from moving
and blinking, keep their eyes on the center of the clock, wait for the clock to make one
rotation before moving, move spontaneously “without preplanning,” note the ever
changing position of the clock hand, remember the clock hand position, and maintain
general attentional arousal. All of these variables may interfere with one’s natural
intentional engagement, one’s phenomenological experience of intention, and/or one’s
ability to report intention.

Figure 11: Representation of cognitive load during tasks.

72

Unfortunately, if the onset of intention is indeed misreported due to such a
process of interference with one’s natural phenomenology, it may be impossible to
know in which direction this is occurring. Papanicolaou (2017) noted how the presence
of multiple demands for attention during tasks can lead to the well-established effect of
prior entry, in which multiple simultaneous events cannot occur all at once. He noted
the demand for at least three simultaneous acts during Libet-style tasks: making a
movement, observing the clock, and remembering the position of the clock at the time
of an event. He argued that the presence of the effect of prior entry means that only one
of these events can occur at a time. It is unclear – and perhaps impossible to determine –
which two of the three events are delayed in time. Thus, even if we forego other
reservations about individuals’ ability to accurately perceive and report on his/her
experiences, this effect indicates that only one event can be perceived at a time, leading
to an unknown amount of error in perception and/or reporting for all other simultaneous
events. Since there are many additional ongoing demands like those previously
discussed, this effect may be extremely significant. This appears to be the same
troubling phenomenon noted by Banks and Pockett (2007), which they referred to as
systematic reporting priority.
Papanicolaou (2017) also discussed the unclear distinction between activity and
passivity in the Libet study. He noted that it is often assumed that participants are
passive observers of their mental states and, thus, can make objective reports about
them. It is as if participants can objectively observe their mental states without
interference or prejudice in the same way that, for example, astronomers are thought to
observe the night sky. Papanicolaou (2017, p. 314) emphasizes that participants are
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active creators of their mental states, noting that they “make choices: choices do not
‘happen’ to them.” Though the assumption of passivity is obviously erroneous,
Papanicolaou argues that it has been taken for granted since the original study of Libet
et al. By undercutting this assumption, he undercuts much of the credibility of the
intention reports made in any forms of Libet study. For one, he undercuts their status as
supposedly “objective” reports. Furthermore, this is yet another example of the HUP in
which the attempt to observe and report on a subjective phenomenon is likely to change
the phenomenon, or, at the least, the ability to make accurate reports about the
phenomenon.
When does intention begin? The results of the current study may appear to
indicate that it begins right at the time of movement and that the traditional Libet study
makes reports biased to be earlier in time. However, the possibility of a HUP applies
equally to all attempts to garner reports about intention, including the current study; any
attempt to affect the natural process of intention is likely to lead to inaccurate reports of
intention. Thus, intention may be present in the tasks but necessarily unamenable to
measurement, no matter the methodological design. Furthermore, since intention is
probably best thought of as a dynamic process spread out in time rather than a discrete,
phenomenologically clear event (Verbaarschot, Haselager, & Farquhar, 2016), the
question of “when” intention begins may not be completely coherent. The attempt to
measure intention as a clear, distinct event may yield empirical results, but those results
may inevitably be inaccurate and misleading. Different methodologies may necessarily
produce different empirical results because each inserts a distinct set of variables into
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participants’ cognitive load, thereby unduly influencing the experience, and reporting,
of intention.
It is also possible – in this study as in any form of the Libet study – that the
previously discussed phenomenon of intentional binding is at play during the tasks,
causing intention to be perceived closer in time to its effect (i.e., movement) than is
actually the case (Banks & Pockett, 2007). This would allow for intention to be present
during the tasks but perceived around the time of movement, as in the current study. If
this is the case, then the current study has more accurately captured the phenomenology
of the experience of intention than the traditional Libet study. However, the
aforementioned problems remain: how could one ever verify that this was actually the
case?
The issue of inferential distance is lurking here. The measurement problems
discussed in the preceding paragraphs are a fundamental problem for the Libet study
because the study is designed to make inferences about intention rather than measuring
it. That is, the issues are encountered because of use of reports of intention. It is a rather
obvious point that the Libet study indirectly attempts to measure intention, and that the
goal of Dominik et al. (2017) and the current study was to determine the validity of
these attempts, but it is a point worth emphasizing. If there were some universally
accepted method of directly measuring intention, perhaps through neuroimaging, then
the Libet study would not have to rely on reports of intention, but this is not the case. In
the absence of an unequivocally established index of intention (if such an index is even
possible), reports of intention are necessary.
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Furthermore, the previously discussed issues regarding task interference with
one’s natural phenomenology reflect a secondary process of inferential distance. As
discussed, it is one thing to carry out an intentional action but quite another to introspect
on that action and try to make reports about it, especially when additional variables are
introduced (e.g., all the rules for monitoring the clock and making movements and
reports). Thus, if intention does exist in the tasks, there is likely inferential distance
between the experience of intention and the report thereof. Therefore, there seem to be
two types of inferential distance between the phenomenon targeted for measurement
(i.e., intention) and the data yielded about that phenomenon (i.e., intention reports). The
reports are not only indirect measurements of intention but also likely to be imperfect
representations of the experience of intention. Note, however, that it would be a mistake
– a form of cognitive elitism – to claim that one’s inability to accurately report his/her
intention means that he/she does not have intention. Surely one can have an experience
without being able to accurately report on it.
The first version of this interpretation appears particularly damaging to the Libet
study. Because it holds that intention actually occurs at the time of movement, it
invalidates the intention reports in the Libet study and its replications. However, it
could potentially strengthen the findings of the Libet study, since it might place
intention even later in time past the late RP. If intention is indeed occurring closer to the
objective time of movement, then perhaps the gap between the late RP and intention is
even larger than it originally appeared. Even if the onset of the late RP is pushed later in
time, perhaps around 200ms prior to movement, it would still precede intention reports
occurring near the time of movement. The second version of this interpretation, in
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which there must be some flaw in the current study, leaves the Libet study completely
undamaged. The third version of this interpretation is damaging to the validity of
intention reports in any version of the Libet study. Thus, proponents of the Libet study
can cleave to the first or second version of this interpretation.
General Interpretation. To sum up, most of the possible interpretations of the
current study are damaging to the validity of intention reports in the Libet study. If
results are interpreted as indicating that intention is not present in the tasks, then the
intention reports in the Libet study are invalidated. On this view, intention reports are
inferred and, thus, not genuine indicators of an experience of intention. Consequently,
the comparison of intention reports with the RP is also invalidated, and conclusions of
the Libet study regarding conscious intention must be discarded. Dominik et al. argued
that an anchoring effect causes these invalid intention reports. They suggested that
movement serves as an objective anchor point from which intention reports are
cognitively inferred to precede. Future research might attempt to provide evidence for
this anchoring effect on other types of reports. For example, a study could ask
participants to deliberately shift movement reports backward or forward in time after
making normal movement reports. If the anchoring effect is real, it seems plausible at
individuals would be able to anchor these reports as well.
If results are interpreted as indicating that intention is present in the tasks, then
two out of the three possible versions of this interpretation invalidate the intention
reports in the Libet study. If one takes intention reports in the second task completed to
be accurate, such that intention occurs near the time of movement, then the standardly
reported time of intention in the Libet study, occurring about 150ms prior to movement,
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is invalidated. Note, however, that intention would still follow the RP in time if it
occurs near the time of movement, and the interval between the RP and intention might
be enlarged. Thus, this interpretation might actually lend credence to the original
conclusions of the Libet study. On another version of this second interpretation, one
might hold that intention is present in the tasks and that the Libet study captured
intention accurately all along, while the current study has some methodological flaw(s)
leading to its unique intention reports. This would appear to be a last resort for a
defender of the Libet study, and one holding this view would need to spell out the flaws
in the current study while justifying the assumptions and apparent limitations of the
Libet study. On the third version of the second interpretation, one might claim that
intention is present in the tasks but that the attempts to measure it inevitably fail. That
is, the natural phenomenology associated with carrying out intentions is affected by the
methodology of each study, such that no study can ever accurately measure intention.
The introduction of a clock to make reports, for example, may inevitably alter the
experience of intention. This view undercuts the validity of all intention reports,
including those of the current study.
Thus, for those who wish to defend the Libet study, there appear to be only two
alternatives, both within the interpretation that intention is present in the tasks. On one
hand, they can accept the results of the current study and thereby accept invalidation of
traditional intention reports but maintain the temporal relation between the RP and
intention. On the other hand, they can reject the results of the current study and thereby
maintain the validity of traditional intention reports.
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Main Effects
The main effects of group and task were significant but not central to the
purposes of the current study. The main effect of group was the comparison of groups
across the combined results of the M Task and W Task (i.e., when the tasks were not
distinguished from one another). The main effect of task was the comparison of tasks
across the groups combined (i.e., when the groups were not distinguished from one
another). To the best of my knowledge, there is no prior research examining or
theorizing about these main effects. Future research might explore whether they indicate
any phenomenon of significance or are simply an artifact of the methodology employed
by studies like the current one. It seems likely that main effects of group and task are
inevitable, but unimportant, consequences of an experimental design in which groups
differ in the order in which they complete tasks.
EMG
The EMG results of the study were somewhat surprising. I expected to find
much less within- and between-subjects variability in EMG onset times relative to
digital triggers. I assumed that most participants would make a simple mouse click in
more or less the same way each time. Before pilot testing, I had hoped the digital
triggers were close enough in time to movement to render EMG data collection
unnecessary. Pilot testing made it clear that this was not the case and that EMG data
should be collected, but, nonetheless, I anticipated being able to calculate an average
EMG correction for each participant and subtract all triggers by that time. Data analysis
quickly revealed more than expected variability in the EMG, and it was necessary to
manually determine movement onset trial by trial. Many trials had to be excluded from
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analysis due to unclear EMG onsets or multiple click-like events. Often participants
were making pre-click movements with their hand, and sometimes the amplitude of
these movements exceeded that of the click-related EMG activity. As noted, EMG onset
times ranged between about 70-200ms prior to trigger onsets.
This seemingly mundane finding regarding calculations for movement onset
may be extremely important for the Libet study. Many researchers have not precisely
reported how they captured the moment of movement initiation (e.g., Haggard & Eimer,
1999), though Jo et al. (2013), for example, noted that they placed an accelerometer on
the mouse itself to determine the onset of the button press. Accelerometers measure
with precision the moment an object begins to move (i.e., accelerate). One is left to
wonder, in the absence of detailed reporting, how precise the moment of movement
initiation has been measured in previous research. If researchers have not adequately
accounted for the variance in movement (i.e., by measuring it precisely and correcting
for it on individual trials) then this variance is a source of error in all Libet study tasks
(other than the S Task). If the objective time of movement onset is not properly
calculated, each individual trial will be affected backward or forward in time by the
error. Consequently, the RP will be improperly time-locked, and reports on the M Task
and W Task will be shifted. The results of the current study recommend further testing
of EMG within the Libet study, or, at the least, improved reporting of how the objective
time of movement is calculated. Accelerometers may be an alternative to EMG, though
it would seem they capture the earliest moment a button begins moving rather than the
earliest moment of bodily movement. As noted, the overall findings of significance in
the current study were consistent whether data were corrected or uncorrected by EMG.
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However, these corrections may be more important when comparing intention to the
late RP.
Future Analyses
Participants who completed the current study returned on the next day for a
second study. This second study has not been reported or discussed within this paper
because data have not yet been analyzed. This study, which I will call Experiment 2,
was a hybrid replication of the Libet study. It aims to incorporate many of the
methodological suggestions and recent findings discussed in the Introduction.
Specifically, in Experiment 2 I aim to compare the late RP, rather than the entire RP, to
intention reports. In addition, I aim to use multiple methods to filter EEG data and to
calculate late RP onset. I will analyze the temporal relation of the late RP and intention
reports on individual, as well as grand, averages, and I will attempt to determine how
various individual differences (e.g., attributional style, performance on the PEQ) impact
the late RP and task performance. Based on the recommendation of Miller et al. (2011),
I developed a new task to measure the late RP without the influence of clockmonitoring. See Figure 12 for the flow of task completion in Experiment 2. I expect the
late RP to generally precede intention reports on grand averages, though deviations may
emerge from this pattern for individual participants. Individual and grand average
deviations may also emerge depending on which combination of data filtering and
calculation methods is chosen. Nonetheless, all results from Experiment 2 should be
tempered by the findings of the study presented in this paper. If the validity of intention
reports is highly questionable, then the results of all studies relying upon intention
reports should be examined with caution.

81

Figure 12: Task order by group, including Experiment 2.
M-First: Group in which the M Task was completed prior to the W Task
W-First: Group in which the W Task was completed prior to the M Task
S Task: Report of onset of stimulus (tone)
M Task: Spontaneous mouse click, then report of movement
W Task: Spontaneous mouse click, then report of intention
Late RP Task: Spontaneous mouse click without monitoring clock; no report made

Philosophical Issues
Let us now examine more generally what implications the Libet study might
have for free will. For the sake of argument, this discussion will assume the validity of
intention reports. As noted, most research has implicated the bilateral SMA for the RP
and the contralateral pre-SMA and motor cortices for the late RP, and some studies
have found correlates of conscious intention in the prefrontal and parietal cortices
(Eccles, 1982; Sirigu et al., 2004; Pirtosek, Georgiev, & Gregoric-Kramberger, 2009).
An fMRI variant of the Libet study was able to build a post-hoc predictive model using
prefrontal and parietal activity (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). These
researchers allowed participants an extended time to choose which hand to use to make
a button press. The model was able to predict which hand would be used up to 10
seconds before the movement occurred, with about 60% accuracy. Fried, Mukamel, and
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Krieman (2011) used intracranial recording to predict the intention to move in advance,
with varying degrees of accuracy depending on which neuron populations were used
and how far in advance the prediction was made. For example, at 700ms prior to the
reported time of intention, the prediction accuracy was above 80% in the SMA. Using
neurons in frontal areas, the prediction could be made 1000ms prior to the time of
reported intention with more than 70% accuracy. Based on these and other results,
many recent models of voluntary movement show movement initiation and preparation
first occurring in prefrontal areas, then travelling to the pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA), then to the SMA and cortical motor areas (Nachev, Wydell, O’Neill,
Husain, & Kennard, 2007; Pirtosek et al. 2009; Sakata et al., 2017). If such models are
accurate, the activity shown in late RP would likely be eliminated as a possible source
of the ultimate origin of movement initiation.
Prefrontal areas are associated with conscious processing and executive
functions. Thus, if they are implicated as the source of spontaneous voluntary
movements, then it is at least possible, if not likely, that conscious intention is playing a
role in initiating the movements after all. The late RP, occurring later in the process,
would be secondary to this initiatory activity and likely related to specific post-intention
movement preparation (see Introduction for a review of the RP and see Appendix A for
a list of abbreviated terms). If this is indeed the case, then the results of the Libet study
and its replications would be invalidated, though we might never know the true cause(s)
of the error in the study. The implication would be that the late RP is ultimately caused
by conscious intention.
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The Libet study has been endlessly cited and replicated because of its
philosophical implications, particularly those for agency and free will. Many took the
findings of the Libet study as proof that conscious intention was an epiphenomenon,
since it was shown to be consistently preceded by the RP. The inference was that nonconscious brain processes, reflected by the RP, were responsible for the decision to
make a voluntary movement. Conscious intention, occurring after the RP, came after
this non-conscious decision had already been made. Now that the relationship between
the entire RP and intention has been discarded as not meaningful, the relationship
between the late RP and intention is up for consideration. In all likelihood, inferences
analogous to those regarding the RP and intention will be drawn for this relationship as
well. If the late RP is shown to precede intention, perhaps the same claims will be made
that were made of the causal power of the non-conscious brain processes reflected by
the RP. It seems likely that the same conclusions concerning the causal impotence of
conscious intention would be reached. However, it is likely that many of the same
criticisms would also apply.
One issue is the hypothesized veto window of Libet et al. (1983), which is the
interval between reported intention times and the time of movement, in which a person
may inhibit a previously prepared movement. If the veto window is a possibility, then
the late RP might be shown to precede intention, but the underlying non-conscious
processes reflected by the late RP might not be the actual cause of intention or the
movement, since an intention to veto the movement could be formed after the late RP.
More generally, the temporal relation between two events does not guarantee that the
earlier event causes the other, and this is true regardless of whether the late RP is shown
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to precede intention or not. It may be that the late RP is a necessary but insufficient
condition for movement. Other processes, including some form of conscious intention,
may be other necessary conditions. Many of the other various criticisms previously
discussed, such as the critique of intention reports as invalid, will remain intact
regardless of whether the RP or late RP is examined.
What would occur if intention reports were indeed shown to precede the late
RP? Even if future research were to somehow show that conscious intention precedes
the late RP and originates movement, this, of course, would not indicate that conscious
intention does not have its own neural correlates. The fact that recent models have
implicated frontal areas as the ultimate source of movement initiation indicates that
conscious intention associated with initiating voluntary movements may be ultimately
traced there, while the SMA, pre-SMA, and motor cortices may only reflect movement
preparations which follow conscious intention. If that is the case, then it is possible that
researchers will eventually arrive at a specific description of neural activity in frontal
areas involved in conscious initiation of movement. However, the problem of
reductionism, which is common in cognitive neuroscientific research, would remain.
The problem is that conscious intention, even if shown to be causally potent on
the psychological level, could possibly be reduced to neural activity. This possibility reraises the question of whether conscious intentions have causal power, but it shifts the
question to the level of philosophical inquiry, at which point we run into the mind-body
problem and the free will debate. One basic issue is whether conscious intention is
actually causally potent if it can be entirely reduced to physiological activity. There are
volumes written on the subject of reductionism, particularly the reduction of the mental
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to the physical (for a brief overview of issues, see Richards, 2010, pp. 119-130). For our
purposes here, I will focus on the issue of causation. Specifically, I will explore whether
the problem of reductionism might be circumvented, depending on one’s metaphysical
assumptions about causation. If it is possible that causation can occur non-physically,
then complete reduction of the mental to the physical, and all the issues raised thereby,
might be avoided.
The mind-body problem revolves around the issue of mental states and physical
states, which prima facie seem to be two completely different types of things. Mental
states – in this case, intentions – appear to be private and non-physical, while physical
states – in this case, neural activity – are publicly observable and measurable
(Robinson, 2016). A classic mind-body question noted by Robinson (2016) is whether
mental states are a subset of physical states and can be reduced to them (or vice versa).
Robinson also asks how the two states can causally interact; can each state cause the
other or is the causality only in one direction? The most famous attempted resolution of
the problem is Rene Descartes’s substance dualism. Descartes proposed a metaphysical
system in which reality consists of two distinct types of substances: extended
substances, which are physical objects in space, and thinking substances, which are
minds outside of space. Descartes was an interactionist in that he claimed that the two
substances interface and interact in the pineal gland. For Descartes, the mind was
wholly different from the body but controlled the body and received sensations from it.
Among the alternatives to substance dualism, substance monism is of note. Substance
monism claims that there is only one kind of state. Most substance monists are physical
monists; they believe that mental states are just a subset of physical states. In other
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words, everything that exists, including thoughts, feelings, beliefs, etc., is material.
There is no need to posit an interaction between mental and physical states because
there is no true ontological distinction between them; the apparent distinction is only in
their qualitative properties because both are fundamentally physical.
It seems reasonable to assume that the Libet study was approaching conscious
intention – and, by proxy, free will and the mind-body problem – from a substance
monistic standpoint, particularly physical monism. This should not be surprising, as it is
the default approach of contemporary science and philosophy (Robinson, 2016).
Neuroscientific research into the physical nature of mental states is at the threshold of
the mind-body problem and inevitably makes metaphysical assumptions. By definition,
scientific investigations into the nature of the mind assume that mental states have
physical correlates. Mental phenomena are assumed to have physiological correlates
that are measurable with neuroimaging or other technology. Substance dualism is also
compatible with this assumption. Its proponents hold that mental events can cause
physical events even though the mental events themselves, existing outside of space and
time, are undetectable. Conscious intention would presumably arise out of a person’s
non-physical intention, but physical (neural) activity would still arise. However,
physical monism is typically preferred over substance dualism because it does not have
to explain such immaterial causation. The basic difference in the two views, in terms of
causality, is that physical monism holds that the physical account is the account; the
physical world is causally closed. There is no causality outside the physical world, such
that mental states can theoretically be completely understood in physical terms.
Substance dualists, on the other hand, allow for non-physical causality. Thus, the
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physical account of the world is not complete; the physical world is not causally closed
because it also involves non-physical mental causation. No physical account of the
world can capture this mental causation, even though mental states can have physical
correlates.
For the sake of argument, let us imagine that neuroscientific research was able to
establish that conscious intention does cause voluntary movement and had provided us
with an exhaustive neuroscientific account of this causation. These findings would not
rule out the possibility of substance dualism because immaterial causation, though
undetectable, could be at play. Although the possibility of such causation is routinely
dismissed, it must be acknowledged that it is done so on the basis of metaphysical
assumptions rather than empirical evidence. The evidence itself cannot decide the issue
one way or the other. Thus, two fundamental aspects of the current study should be
acknowledged. It is approaching conscious intention within a physical monist
framework, and this framework assumes, but does not prove, its metaphysical claims.
Evidence collected within a physical monist framework, including evidence to be
collected by the current study, does not prove its metaphysical claims and cannot rule
out the claims of substance dualism or other approaches.
Keeping this in mind, we can better examine any implications that this study
might have for the issue of free will. There is a variety of competing conceptions of free
will. Many conceptions differ drastically from one another, while others differ only in
nuanced ways, and nearly every issue pertaining to free will is subject to debate and
competing conceptions (Timpe, 2018). This diversity of conceptions has led McKenna
& Coates (2015) to attempt a definition of free will that is neutral with respect to
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conceptual and theoretical commitments. For these authors, free will is “the unique
ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for
moral responsibility” (McKenna & Coates, 2015, p. 4).
In order to explore what is meant by having control over conduct, we must first
define determinism. Determinism is the notion that every event is caused (i.e.,
determined) by previous events, such that any given event can only occur in one way,
given all the preceding events that led up to it. In other words, given the causal history
of the universe at any moment in time, only one future is possible. Causality, here,
refers to the operation of natural laws and processes. Of course, determinism is also
subject to various conceptions and is not universally accepted. For example, it competes
with conceptions of probabilistic causation, in which causes increase the likelihood of
certain outcomes but do not strictly determine specific outcomes. However, the two
major conceptions of free will have this conception of determinism as their starting
points, either accepting determinism and then spelling out its implications
(compatibilism) or juxtaposing it with free will and rejecting either it or free will
(incompatibilism).
Compatibilists claim that free will is possible within a deterministic universe;
free will is compatible with determinism. Incompatibilists claim that if the universe is
indeed deterministic, then free will is not possible; free will is incompatible with
determinism. Again, each conception contains within itself an array of specific theories
which spell out the details of how the relation between free will and determinism is or is
not possible. To simplify matters, I will frame the two conceptions in terms of the socalled “ability to do otherwise” (Nahmias et al., 2004). Incompatibilists argue that the
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ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will. On this view, if John is presented with
options A, B, and C and is causally determined to choose option A (i.e., he could not
have chosen otherwise), then he did not have free will. Having free will entails having
freedom from determinism, such that John can decide upon the choice for himself and
create his future. Furthermore, moral responsibility is not possible unless one has such
freedom. Compatibilists argue that John has free will despite the inability to choose
otherwise. In this sense, freedom is the ability to carry out an action that one attempts to
carry out, and John is responsible for his actions despite being determined to choose in
one way over another. The only way for John to lack free will is for him to be prevented
from carrying out his action by some force of coercion or constraint. For example, John
would lack free will if he wanted to choose A but was forcibly made to choose B or if
option A was no longer possible for some reason.
Substance dualism is mostly associated with libertarian notions of free will.
Libertarians are incompatibilists who claim that free will does exist. Many tend to
invoke some form of non-physical soul or mind as the source of freedom (i.e., substance
dualism). On this view, free will could not exist within a physical universe in which
there is total determinism. Free will does exist, however, because in this universe there
is not total determinism; the source of one’s will is non-physical and, thus, outside the
physical deterministic scheme. On the other end of the spectrum, hard determinists are
incompatibilists who argue that the entire universe is physical and deterministic and that
there is no room for free will. Thus, physical monism is more associated with hard
determinism, while substance dualism is more associated with libertarianism.

90

The Libet study and many of its replications and variants tend to discuss free
will without spelling out which major conception (compatibilism or incompatibilism)
and/or which specific conception (e.g., libertarianism or hard determinism) they are
employing. However, it is reasonable to assume that most have some form of
incompatibilism in mind and are looking to the Libet study and other neuroscientific
research to settle the question of whether the mind is just another physically determined
system. When authors claim that findings do or do not provide evidence against the
notion of free will, they are indicating that free will is scientifically measurable and that
specific results could demonstrate that free will does not exist.
Here we are at the crux of the issue. For incompatibilists, the metaphysical
assumption made about the nature of causation will determine whether all mental states
are reducible to physical states. For hard determinists, who assume complete physical
causation, such reduction is possible. For libertarians, who do not assume complete
physical causation (i.e., at least some mental states are non-physical), such reduction is
not possible. From the hard determinist perspective, the Libet study and its successors,
as well as other psychophysiological research, can provide further evidence that all
mental states are physical. That is, such research can show that, or how, the mental can
be reduced to the physical. For libertarians, such research may provide information
about the physical correlates of mental states but cannot capture the entire causal
picture. From the libertarian perspective, no matter how well the mental appears to be
reduced to the physical, one cannot rule out the possibility of immaterial causation.
Thus, it is clear that one’s metaphysical assumptions determine how one
interprets scientific evidence and how one approaches the problems of reductionism and
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causation. Even if a supposedly exhaustive account of the neural underpinnings of
conscious intention were to be produced, one could not claim that it was a total,
unequivocal psychophysiological reduction and that “free will” had been disproved.
One can only make such claims after many metaphysical assumptions have been made.
Any empirical claim built upon a priori assumptions cannot be total or unequivocal,
whether it is a claim made by hard determinists, libertarians, or others. The specter of
reductionism is indeed a possible threat to free will, since it is possible that all mental
states, including one’s intentions, are physically determined. However, it should be
clear that it may be impossible to resolve the problem of reductionism, since the nature
of causality and related issues depend on one’s metaphysical assumptions. Libertarians
and hard determinists may be in an interminable deadlock, for it would seem that no
amount of empirical evidence can determine which set of assumptions is correct.
Furthermore, note that even if complete physical causation were proven and
psychophysiological reductionism achieved, compatibilist free will (i.e., free will is
compatible with determinism; see above) would survive to compete with the hard
determinist claim that complete physical causation entails the non-existence of free will.
As noted, the current study, as well as other versions of the Libet study and
cognitive neuroscientific research in general, approaches mental events like intention
from a physical monist perspective. We tend to assume that by capturing correlates of
mental states, we can come to a complete causal picture of the mind. From the previous
discussion, it should be clear that such research is only one line of inquiry into the
debates about free will. Claims about psychophysiological reductionism, mental
causation, and free will are ultimately grounded on a priori metaphysical assumptions.
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The current study has not adhered to or argued for any one conception of free will.
Instead, it had strived to simply present findings and make clear what these can and
cannot show. The current study can provide evidence about physical phenomena
associated with conscious intention, but it cannot decide philosophical issues like the
mind-body problem or the free will debate. Findings must be interpreted within the
physical monist framework in which they were collected, but they are not proof of the
framework, and the framework itself, fundamentally based on assumptions, can never
be definitive proof against “free will.”
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VI.

Limitations

Terminology. As discussed in the Introduction, there is a lack of standardization
in the instructions and terminology in the replications and variants of the Libet study.
There is a lack of consistency in phrases and terms in how “intention” reports and
“intention” in the context of voluntary movements are framed to participants. Because
of this, researchers in the current study deliberately used the two most common words,
urge and intention, when referring to making spontaneous movements and to making
reports on the W Task (see Method). As with other aspects of methodology, these
differences could account for some of the variance in results among studies. Future
researchers could seek to determine whether simple differences in phrasing have an
impact on results. If possible, this aspect of methodology should be standardized.
Question 10 of the PEQ, which asked which term is most appropriate for what is
reported in the W Task, may shed some light on which terms to use (see Appendix O).
Responses revealed that seven participants preferred the word “urge” and six preferred
the word “impulse.” Only two of 19 participants preferred the word “intention.” Of the
four who opted for a different word, one said that it was a toss-up between urge and
impulse but definitely not an intention. Another said that he/she was waiting to get the
“thought about clicking” and then clicked “when I heard the word click.” Another
coined the phrase “spontaneous decision to act” and emphasized that “urge” was not the
correct descriptor. One participant noted that he/she was definitely not reporting an
impulse but, rather, something between an urge and impulse. A few participants noted
that “urge” did not seem quite right because the impetus to move was not a bodily event
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but a mental event. A few noted that “intention” did not seem quite right because there
was not a normal process of decision-making.
This feedback suggests that urge or impulse may be better words to use than
intention. However, it also indicates that individual differences are likely to exist with
respect to each person’s definition of the word and, in particular, what the word means
to the person as he/she proceeds through tasks. There are likely diverse understandings
of words like intention and urge. Researchers may wish to clearly define any terms used
in an experiment, but this leads to a further issue, related to the original question raised
by Dominik et al. (2017) and address in this study: does providing a priori distinctions,
like definitions, induce demand characteristics? That is, even if researchers try to
remove individual differences in understanding of a term, this may induce confusion
and/or invalid task performance. This seems to be another case of a HUP; the more a
natural subjective experience or understanding is tampered with, the more it is likely to
be unduly biased or changed. This possibility lends even more credibility to the
interpretation of results which held that intention was present in the tasks but that
attempts to measure intention inevitably alter one’s natural phenomenology (see
Discussion).
Richards (2010, p. 294) has noted how applying language to psychological
phenomena is a highly reflexive enterprise. Crucially, how one labels, discusses, and
thinks about psychological phenomena is likely to affect the phenomena. Furthermore, a
more fundamental issue looms; given the notorious difficulty of externally verifying
introspective experience, how could researchers ever know participants were
conforming to what they have in mind for “urge” or whatever word is chosen?
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Researchers may simply have to accept individual differences in the understanding of
vague terms like intention or urge and/or in the phenomenology of carrying out
movements like those in the Libet study. Future research could attempt to examine the
influence of different word choices on participants. Different groups could complete
identical tasks and simply vary based on which word is chosen to describe the impetus
to move in the M Task and W Task and what to report in the W Task.
Control Condition. A limitation of the current study is its lack of a control
condition in which participants undergo the normal Libet study methodology. A control
condition would include two more groups: an M-First Control and a W-First Control,
each of which completed tasks in the same order as their experimental group
counterparts. These groups would differ in that they would be fully informed of both the
M Task and W Task at the beginning of the experiment, and of the distinction between
them. In this way, it could be determined whether the results of the current study are in
any way influenced by the mere order of task completion rather than the withholding of
information that keeps participants naïve about the distinction between movement and
intention.
Untreated Factors. A variety of untreated factors may have contributed some
variance to results. For example, I did not attempt to measure or correct small lags that
may have occurred between linked hardware and software systems. I collected data on
handedness and gender but have not conducted advanced analyses involving these and
other variables as covariates. In addition, I did not collect data on other variables which
might have impacted task performance, such as working memory capacity, familiarity
with computers, and frequency of using a computer mouse. I did not counterbalance
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variables such as mouse response mapping and time of day of sessions. I did not have a
harness available to achieve a maximally stable visual angle, so individual differences
in height, movement, sitting style, etc. may have caused slight deviations from the
desired visual angle. Unfortunately, responses to the preplanning question at the end of
the M Task and W Task, which was intended to identify and/or remove potentially
incorrectly executed trials, were not saved due to researcher error in programming the
tasks. Therefore, no blocks of trials could be discarded on the basis of reported
preplanning.
The results of the current study were based on group averages. It is possible that
individuals experienced the tasks and instructions differently. Indeed, as noted above
(see Results), there was variability on many questions of the PEQ, though this
variability was not significant between groups. Specifically, there was division among
participants regarding whether there was a gap in time between intentions and
movements, whether an intention was always felt before they moved, and what term to
use to label the phenomenon they were reporting in the W Task. Some individuals may
readily feel and/or make a distinction between moving and intending to move, while
others may not. For example, one participant reported that she felt she was “lying”
about her reports on the W Task to comply with instructions. It seems reasonable to
suppose that individual differences exist in the phenomenology of carrying out
movements like those in the Libet study (Nahmias et al., 2004). Though the PEQ did
not detect any differences between groups, a more rigorous and validated test, designed
specifically to test for differences in phenomenologies, might have found differences
between groups. Such differences might have existed and contributed unknown
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variance to the data. Future studies should administer tests for these differences prior to
completion of tasks, so that groups can be weighted appropriately.
Standardization. Another limitation of the current study, one extendable to
other studies in the Libet paradigm, is that it uses visual stimuli from one experiment
(Jo et al., 2013) but replicates the methodology of another experiment (Dominik et al.,
2017). It seems plausible that small differences in stimuli could significantly impact
findings. For example, the clock used in the current study uses a rotating clock hand
(see Method), while Dominik et al. used a rotating dot. The nature of the clock face also
differed in many ways (e.g., color, fixation stimulus, number of intervals), though the
basic setup (e.g., rotating clockwise, revolution period of 2.56 seconds) was mostly
identical. Without standardized stimuli, it seems important to note the possibility that at
least some of the variance in results among studies, such as the discrepancies in the
findings of the current study compared to the findings of Libet et al. (1983), is due to
differences in stimuli. Future researchers might make a project of standardizing stimuli
and other aspects of the Libet study’s methodology. In the absence of such
standardization, researchers should seek to mirror all aspects of the studies whose
findings they are seeking to replicate. The current study could be improved, then, by
changing the nature of its stimuli to match that of Dominik et al. Alternatively, the
current study’s stimuli could be changed to mirror that of Libet et al. or a more recent
replication of the study. Lastly, it should be noted that the current study used mouse
clicks, while Dominik et al. used button presses and Libet et al. used wrist flexions.
Though all these movements appear to be similar, one cannot rule out the possibility
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that some of the differences between studies are attributable to differences in type of
movement.
Clock Precision. Another limitation of the current study extendable to the Libet
study in general is that participant reports may appear more precise than they actually
are. As noted, each tick on the clock spanned approximately 16.667 milliseconds, or
2.35° of the clock face (see Materials). Recall that participants, as they noted clock hand
position, were supposed to be looking at the center of the clock rather than the clock
hand or clock face. It seems unlikely that such a setup would allow participants to note
and report clock hand position with accuracy on the scale of tens of milliseconds. One
participant specifically noted that looking at the center prevented an accurate report of
clock hand position and that he/she could only report a number “close by” the probable
position. The purpose of the S Task was to try to account for general bias in using the
clock. As discussed, there was extreme variability in S Task results (Appendix K). This
may reflect, at least in part, a human subject limitation in using the Libet-style clock. It
may be that the maximum attainable temporal resolution with the clock is on the order
of 50ms or more, as reflected by S Task results. For example, though the clock ticks
every 16.667ms, the average person may do well just to report clock hand position
within 3 or more ticks or its actual location.
This is an important consideration for all versions of the Libet study, since
effects are on the order of hundreds of milliseconds or less. This becomes even more
important when comparing the late RP and intention, since these two “events” appear to
onset even closer in time than the RP and intention in the traditional Libet study. This
alone should cause us to reconsider the argument of Banks and Pockett (2007) that

99

various methodological issues with the Libet study should be ignored (see Introduction).
These authors argued that such variability could be ignored because the temporal order
of the RP and intention, being 350ms or greater, was not likely to be reversed by any
individual factor. The imprecision of the clock method of reporting, as well as other
variables contributing to variance in reports, could significantly shrink or even reverse
the interval between the late RP and intention reports (assuming the validity of
traditional intention reports).
Motivation and Arousal. It seems plausible that motivation and arousal might
account for some of the findings of the current study. It may be that participants are
more engaged in the first task (S Task) and second task than the third task, which might
have led to confounding factors in the third task completed. The second task used the
same clock as the S Task but was novel in that it departed significantly from S Task
methodology. The third task, by comparison, was identical to the second task aside from
requiring a different type of report. All tasks, of course, were repetitive and simple.
Participants’ motivation to engage may have waned once they realized that the third
task was minimally novel and of the same nature as the second task. Though the second
task only lasted about 7-10 minutes, participants completed 60 regular trials, which was
undoubtedly taxing. The third task also consisted of 60 regular trials. Thus, it is possible
that some of the differences between the second and third task completed are
attributable to differences in attentional engagement. However, it should be noted that
this potential confound does not affect the core finding of the nonsignificant difference
between groups on the second task completed. Future studies should find ways to
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ensure that motivation and arousal are sustained. For example, researchers might build
in more breaks within tasks or give a longer break between tasks.
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VII.

Conclusions and Future Directions

I was able to replicate the basic results of Dominik et al. (2017). My basic goal
was to determine whether the intention reports used by Libet et al. (1983) were valid
measures of intention. Nearly all possible interpretations of the current study’s results
are damaging to the validity of these intention reports. Those who wish to defend the
validity and findings of the Libet study are left with some recourse, but the prospects
are not good (see Discussion). However, more replications of the study by Dominik et
al. are needed. Future studies could overcome the aforementioned limitations of the
current study. For example, all potential covariates could be measured and included in
analyses. In these replications and in any version of the Libet study, researchers should
ensure they are precisely capturing the moment of movement onset, and they should
clearly report the procedures employed to do so. The basic findings of the current study
and other versions of the Libet study will become clearer as more variance is removed
from the data and as more standardization is achieved across studies. However, from the
foregoing discussion of results and of the philosophical issues in play, it seems
reasonable to assume that some level of uncertainty will always be present in attempts
to scientifically study conscious intention. No matter how much progress is made, or
apparently made, it may be that studying conscious intention inevitably runs up against
intractable problems like inferential distance, causes irresolvable dilemmas like various
forms of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, or leads us to the non-empirical realm of
a priori metaphysical assumptions.
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Abbreviated Terms
Abbreviation

Term

Definition

EEG

electroencephalography

Measurement of the brain’s electrical activity
via electrodes on the scalp

EMG

electromyography

Measurement of bodily movement via electrodes
placed on target areas

ERP

event-related potential

Waveform elicited by a specific neural event;
created by averaging many EEG readings at a
single electrode site

RP

readiness potential

ERP waveform found to precede voluntary
movements; Slow negative shift in activity at Cz
electrode site between .5 and 2 seconds before a
voluntary movement

W

“wanting” time

Time of conscious awareness of the urge or the
“wanting” to move, as reported by participants

M

movement time

Time of actual movement, as reported by
participants

S

stimulus time

Time of perception of an external stimulus, as
reported by participants

SMA

supplementary motor area

Source of the RP; located in the posterior area of
frontal cortex

Early RP

early readiness potential

Earliest portion of the RP, occurring between
~1000-400ms prior to movement

Late RP

late readiness potential

Latest portion of the RP, occurring between
movement and ~400ms prior to movement
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Abbreviated Terms (continued)
Abbreviation

Term

Definition

ERD

event-related

A temporary, localized decrease in amplitude of

desynchronization

a particular band (frequency) of rhythmic brain
activity

ASQ

Attributional Style

Yields composite score and binary classification

Questionnaire

of positive or negative attributional style

Post-Experiment

Includes 10 questions about participants’

Questionnaire

experiences with various aspects of the study

S Task

Stimulus Task

Participants reported the onset of a tone

M Task

Movement Task

Participants made a spontaneous voluntary

PEQ

movement and reported the moment they
initiated their movement
W Task

Wanting (Intention) Task

Participants made a spontaneous voluntary
movement and reported the moment they
intended to move

Late RP Task

M-First Group

Late Readiness Potential

Participants made a spontaneous voluntary

Task

movement without monitoring an analog clock

Movement Task-First Group

Participants in this group completed the S Task,
M Task, and the W Task, respectively

W-First Group

HUP

Wanting (Intention) Task-

Participants in this group completed the S Task,

First Group

W Task, and the M Task, respectively

Heisenberg Uncertainty

In physics: the speed and position of an object

Principle

cannot be exactly measured simultaneously
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Appendix B: Consent Form
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
Conscious Intention and Free Will: A Hybrid Replication of the Libet Study
Why am I being asked to participate in this research?
You are being invited to take part in a research study about making simple movements
(pressing a button) while viewing a clock on a computer screen. You are being invited
to participate in this study because you are an undergraduate student at Eastern
Kentucky University. If you take part in this study, you will be one of about 40 people
to do so.
Who is doing the study?
The person in charge of this study is Paul Sanford at Eastern Kentucky University. He
is being guided in this research by Adam Lawson, Ph.D. There may be other people on
the research team assisting at different times during the study, including Nicole King &
Madison Major.
What is the purpose of the study?
By doing this study, we hope to learn about the timing of brain processes related to
conscious movement.
Where is the study going to take place and how long will it last?
The research procedures will be conducted at Room 107 in the Cammack Building on
the campus of Eastern Kentucky University (468 Lancaster Ave., Richmond, KY 40475).
You will need to come to 107 Cammack on two consecutive days for the study. Each
visit will take about 1.5 hours, for a total of 3 hours over two days. You will earn 6
outside credit units on SONA for your participation.
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What will I be asked to do?
There are several tasks to be completed, with some on Day 1 and others on Day 2.
You will be randomly assigned to one of two groups, with the difference being the
order of tasks you are asked to do. You will be fully informed of the differences in the
groups after you have completed the study. Each day you will be hooked up to our
physiology equipment, which measures electroencephalographic (EEG) activity and
electromyographic (EMG) activity.

Day 1:
1. You will begin by completing a Personal Information Sheet and the Attributional
Style Questionnaire. This should take about 15 minutes.
2. Next you will be hooked up to the physiology equipment.
a. A standard electrode cap will be placed on your head, with five
electrode sites used to collect data.
b. You will complete two separate blocks of tasks. Each block will consist
of five training trials and then 40 normal trials. On both blocks, you will
be making a key press with the index finger of your dominant hand.
c. For these tasks, you will be monitoring a revolving dot on a digital clock
to make certain types of reports, which will be explained in detail as you
progress through the experiment. You will mentally note the dot’s
position on the clock and then use a mouse to indicate that position
when a certain event occurred.
d. Each block will take about 25 minutes. You will be allowed to rest for
two minutes after the first block and for one minute halfway through
each block. Within each block, you will be allowed to rest 2-3 seconds
between each trial you complete. This process will take about one
hour.
e. You will then be unhooked from the EEG system. You will be allowed to
use our towels and sink to clean your hair if you wish, and then you
may leave. In all, you will spend about 1.5 hours with us on Day 1.

Day 2:
1. You will be hooked up to the physiology equipment.
a. This time, you will complete six blocks of tasks. Each block will consist
of 30 trials. There are four different tasks to complete. You will
complete two of them once and two of them twice, for a total of six
blocks. Each block will contain only one type of task.
b. For five out of the six blocks, you will be asked to make a key press
with the index finger of your dominant hand.
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c. For most of the blocks, you will be using the same clock to make
reports as you did in Task 1. The specific events and instructions will
be described as you progress through the study.
d. Each block will take about 8 minutes. You will be allowed to rest for
two minutes between each block and for one minute halfway through
each block. Within each block, you will be allowed to rest 2-3 seconds
between each trial you complete.
e. This entire process should take about one hour. You will then be
unhooked from the equipment and allowed to clean up your hair if you
wish.
2. Before leaving, you will be asked to complete the Post-Experiment
Questionnaire. Then you will be debriefed on the experiment. This should
take about 15 minutes. In all, you will spend about 1.5 hours here on Day 2.
3.
Are there reasons why I should not take part in this study?
Only those individuals who meet ALL the following requirements will be allowed to
participate.








EKU students who are registered in the Psychology department’s research signup
(SONA) system.
At or above 18 years of age.
Having normal or corrected vision.
Having normal or corrected hearing.
NOT having any prior nor current neurological disorder.
NOT having any learning or reading disability.
NOT pregnant.

What are the possible risks and discomforts?
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm
than you would experience in everyday life.
The physiological and computer equipment with which you will come into contact will be
electrically shielded to ensure that risk of electrical shock is no greater than their
everyday use of electronics. To minimize the risk of electrical shock during a storm, the
experiment will be suspended when lightning is in the area.
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EEG hookup with an electrode cap can be mildly uncomfortable if worn for long periods
of time. The cap may fit tightly to your head, putting mild pressure on your scalp. To
minimize this discomfort, you will only be hooked up to the physiology equipment while
you are completing the computer tasks. As soon as you finish, the equipment will be
removed, before you complete the rest of the study.

To establish connections between your skin and the electrodes, we use hypoallergenic
saline gel, which is not known to harm hair or skin. However, dried gel can give the
appearance of dandruff or dried hair gel. We recommend that you bring a hat or hair
wrap to wear after you leave. You will be allowed to rinse or wash your hair in the sink
in Cammack 111. Although we have no knowledge of any aversive reactions to the
saline gel, we recommend washing your hair before the end of the day as a precaution.

Upon arrival, you will be asked to provide your SONA identification code, which the
researcher will use to verify that you are the correct participant. Your name will be
recorded on this form but on no others. This consent form will be securely kept
separately from all other documentation, so only your SONA code will appear with all
other documentation and data. All computers are kept in secure research rooms and
contain security codes in order to ensure that non-researchers do not have access to
the data. Paper records, including the consent form, and electronic files of data will
only be stored in Cammack 109 on the EKU Richmond campus. The room is kept
locked, and data files will only be stored in locked cabinets and locked computers. All
data is computerized (no paper trail) and will be kept for at least 3 years following the
study’s completion. Computer data is coded using your SONA code, so no personally
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identifiable information is kept with the computer data. No personally identifiable
information will be kept on any document held by the researcher, except for the
consent form, which will contain the name and 5-digit SONA code of the participant.

Will I benefit from taking part in this study?
You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study other than 6 SONA
credits (see below).
Do I have to take part in this study?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer.
You will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to
volunteer. You can stop at any time during the study and still keep the benefits and
rights you had before volunteering.
If I don’t take part in this study, are there other choices?
If you do not want to take part in the study, there are other studies on SONA in which
you can participate to earn SONA credits.
What will it cost me to participate?
There are no costs associated with taking part in this study.
Will I receive any payment or rewards for taking part in the study?
You will receive 6 SONA credits for taking part in this study. If you should have to quit
before the study is finished, the credits you receive will be based on the proportion of
time you were in the study.
Who will see the information I give?
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in
the study. When we write up the study to share it with other researchers, we will
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write about this combined information. You will not be identified in these written
materials.

We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from
knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is. For example, your
name will be kept separate from the information you give, and these two things will be
stored in different places under lock and key.

There are extreme circumstances in which we may have to show your information to
other people, including a court order, a suspicion of child abuse, or a concern that you
may harm yourself. Keep this in mind when talking to us. Also, we may be required
to show information that identifies you to people who need to be sure we have done
the research correctly; these would be people from such organizations as Eastern
Kentucky University ethics boards (i.e., IRB).
Can my taking part in the study end early?
If you decide to take part in the study, you still have the right to decide at any time that
you no longer want to participate. You will not be treated differently if you decide to
stop taking part in the study.

The individuals conducting the study may need to end your participation in the study.
They may do this if you are not able to follow the directions they give you, if they find
that your being in the study is more risk than benefit to you, or if the agency funding the
study decides to stop the study early for a variety of scientific reasons.
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If you should have to quit before the study is finished, the credits you receive will be
based on the proportion of time you were in the study.
What happens if I get hurt or sick during the study?
If you believe you are hurt or you get sick because of something that is done during the
study, you should call Paul Sanford at (270) 776-4305 immediately. It is important for
you to understand that Eastern Kentucky University will not pay for the cost of any care
or treatment that might be necessary because you get hurt or sick while taking part in
this study. That cost will be your responsibility. Also, Eastern Kentucky University will
not pay for any wages you may lose if you are harmed by this study.

Usually, medical costs that result from research-related harm cannot be included as
regular medical costs. Therefore, the costs related to your child’s care and treatment
because of something that is done during the study will be your responsibility. You
should ask your insurer if you have any questions about your insurer’s willingness to pay
under these circumstances.
What if I have questions?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask
any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions about the
study, you can contact the investigator, Paul Sanford, at paul_sanford2@mymail.eku.edu
or (270) 776-4305. If you have any questions about your rights as a research volunteer,
contact the staff in the Division of Sponsored Programs at Eastern Kentucky University at
859-622-3636. We will give you a copy of this consent form to take with you.
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What else do I need to know?
You will be told if any new information is learned which may affect your condition or
influence your willingness to continue taking part in this study. You may ask the
researcher questions at any time.

I have thoroughly read this document, understand its contents, have been given an
opportunity to have my questions answered, and agree to participate in this research
study.

___________________________________________
_________________________
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

____________________________________________
Printed name of person taking part in the study

____________________________________________
Name of person providing information to subject
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Appendix C: Attributional Style Questionnaire
Attributional Style Questionnaire
Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that follow. If such a situation
happened to you, what would you feel would have caused it? While events may have
many causes, we want you to pick only one—the major cause if this event happened
to you. Please write this cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want
you to answer some questions about the cause. To summarize, we want you to:

1. Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you.
2. Decide what you feel would be the major cause of the situation if it happened to
you.

3. Write one cause in the blank provided.
4. Answer three questions about the cause.
5. Go on to the next situation.
You meet a friend who compliments you on your appearance.

1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of the complement due to something about you or something about
other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)
Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances

1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when a friend compliments you on your appearance, will this cause
again be present? (Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you getting a compliment from a
friend, or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for some time.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about you or
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

2

me
3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again be present? (Circle one
number)
Will never
again be

Will always
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present

1

be present

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job, or does it also
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You become very rich.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of your becoming rich due to something about you or something
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

2

me
3

4

5
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6

7

3. In the future if you become rich again, will this cause again be present? (Circle
one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences becoming rich, or does it also influence
other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A friend comes to you with a problem and you don’t try to help.

1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of your not helping due to something about you or something about
other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

2

me
3

4

5
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6

7

3. In the future when a friend comes to you with a problem, will this cause again be
present? (Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you when a friend comes to you with a
problem, or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You give an important talk in front of a group and the audience reacts
negatively.

1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of the negative audience reaction due to something about you or
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances

me
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you give an important talk in front of a group, will this cause
again be present? (Circle one number)

Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you when you give an important talk in
front of a group, or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one
number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You do a project that is highly praised.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of the praise due to something about you or something about other
people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
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to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you complete projects, will this cause again be present?
(Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you receiving praise for a project, or
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

You meet a friend who acts hostilely toward you.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.
2. Is the cause of your friend’s hostility due to something about you or something
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
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7

to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you meet with friends, will this cause again be present? (Circle
one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences your friends’ hostility towards you, or
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You can’t get all the work done that others expect of you.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of your inability to get all the work done due to something about you
or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
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to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you are trying to get all the work done that others expect of
you, will this cause again be present? (Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences your ability to get all the work done, or
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

Your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) has been treating you more lovingly.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of this more loving treatment due to something about you or
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

133

7

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you are treated more lovingly by your spouse
(boyfriend/girlfriend), will this cause again be present? (Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences how you are treated by your spouse
(boyfriend/girlfriend), or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one
number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You apply for a position that you want very badly (e.g. important job, graduate
school admission) and you get it.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of you getting the position due to something about you or something
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)
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Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you apply for a position you want badly, will this cause again
be present? (Circle one number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you when you are applying for
positions you want badly, or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle
one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

You go out on a date and it goes badly.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

2. Is the cause of your date going badly due to something about you or something
about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number)
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Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you go on a date, will this cause again be present? (Circle one
number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences going on a date, or does it also
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)

Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

5

6

You get a raise.
1. Write down one major cause
______________________________________________________.

136

7

2. Is the cause of your raise due to something about you or something about other
people or circumstances? (Circle one number)

Totally due
to other
people or

Totally due to

circumstances
1

me

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. In the future when you get a raise, will this cause again be present? (Circle one
number)
Will never
again be

Will always

present

be present

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Is the cause something that just influences you getting a raise, or does it also
influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number)
Influences
just this
particular
situation

Influences

in my life

all situations

1

2

3

4

137

5

6

7
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Appendix D: Personal Information Sheet
SONA ID: _____________________
Gender ________________________
Age (in years) ___________________
Handedness (circle one):

Left

Right

Ambidextrous

Place an X next to all racial demographics that apply:
________ Caucasian

________ Pacific Islander

________ Hispanic

________ Native American

________ African American

________ Other: ______________

________ Asian
Are you taking any medication or any substance which might affect your ability to
focus during a computer task?

Yes

/

No

If yes, then briefly explain:

139

Appendix E: Post-Experiment Questionnaire

140

Appendix E: Post-Experiment Questionnaire
Instructions to researcher: For items 1-9, ask participants to respond Yes/No to each
question and record their responses. Ask them to explain each answer. For item 10,
have participants select among the options and explain their reasoning.
1. Were you confused by any aspects of the study?
2. Did your performance on tasks change as you progressed through the study?
3. Are you confident that most of your intention reports were accurate?
4. Are you confident that most of your movement reports were accurate?
5. Did you feel there was a gap in time between your intentions and your
movements?
6. Did you always feel an intention to move before you moved?
7. Did you use a strategy when monitoring the clockhand?
8. Did you tend to make your clicks at similar places (e.g. near one or two
particular spots)?
9. Have you ever heard of the Libet study?
10. Which word best describes what you reported in W tasks: intention, urge,
impulse, or some other word?
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Appendix F: Debriefing Form
Thank you for your participation. The main purpose of this study was to
examine the brain processes involved in performing a conscious action. We will
compare the various reports you made with the activity your brain showed during your
button presses. This study was a replication of a study known as the “Libet study,”
which was originally conducted by Benjamin Libet and colleagues (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The Libet study seemed to show that the onset of brain activity
associated with conscious (voluntary) movements preceded the intention to move.
An EEG (brainwave) wave known as the readiness potential was shown to
begin about one-third of a second before the reported intention to move. This finding
was somewhat surprising, since it seemed to show that the brain had perhaps already
made the unconscious decision to move before the conscious intention to move had
occurred. The Libet study continues to be replicated and expanded upon by researchers,
but it has been widely criticized for many reasons. For example, it is debatable whether
the extremely simple movements made by participants truly involve what we would call
conscious intentions. This study is an attempt to address some of the Libet study’s
criticisms, but it is based on the same idea and experimental setup.
There were two groups in the current study, which differed in the order in which
they completed the Movement (M) task and Wanting (W) task on Day 1. One group
completed the M task and then the W task, and the other group completed the W task
and then the M task. Otherwise the two groups were identical. You had a 50% chance of
being chosen for either group. We did this because we wanted to compare the
performance of each group on the first task completed. A recent study suggested that
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when participants are not given much information about all the tasks that they will
complete, they might report their movement and their intention to move as happening at
the same point in time rather than at different times (Dominik et al., 2017). This is
important because it could be that in these kinds of experiments, intentions are inferred
rather than actually experienced.
One major innovation of this study is the use of only the late part of the
readiness potential to compare to intention reports, since recent research has shown that
only this part is possibly related to the movement (Schmidt, Jo, Wittmann, &
Hinterberger, 2016). Many of the other innovations of this study will come during data
analysis. For example, the EEG data will be filtered in multiple ways to see how
different filters affect the onset of the readiness potential. The use of the Attributional
Style Questionnaire was included because attributional style (positive vs. negative) has
been shown to be correlated with intention reports (Penton, Thierry, & Davis, 2014).
This study developed the Post-Experiment Questionnaire in order to better understand
what the experiment was like for you (e.g., if you were confused by any aspects of the
experiment). We are interested in seeing how this and other information gathered will
associate with your brain activity and reports of conscious intention.
The “late RP” task, in which you made finger presses without making reports,
will be used to calculate the average onset of the readiness potential. The W task, in
which you made reports of your intention, will be used to calculate the average onset of
your conscious intention to move. The M task, in which you made reports of when you
actually moved, will be compared to the W task. The S task, in which you reported
when the tone occurred, will be used to determine how accurate you are with using the
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clock to make reports. Whatever your error is in making S reports (e.g., making them
50ms too late) will be subtracted from your W and M reports to correct them. Once data
collection is complete, your data will be combined with the data of all other participants
into a grand average. We will compare your individual data with this grand average.
If you are interested in knowing the outcomes of this study or others in Dr.
Lawson’s Psychophysiological Lab, let the researcher know and you will be added to
our lab newsletter that we send out twice a year. If you have any questions, please
contact Paul Sanford at (270) 776-4305 or paul_sanford2@mymail.eku.edu.
For more information:
Dominik, T., Dostal, D., Zielina, M., Smahaj, J., Sedlackova, Z., & Prochazka, R.
(2017). Libet’s experiment: Questioning the validity of the urge to move.
Consciousness and Cognition, 49, 255-263.
Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential).
Brain, 106 (3), 623-642.
Penton, T., Thierry, G. L., & Davis, N. J. (2014). Individual differences in attributional
style but not in interoceptive sensitivity, predict subjective estimates of action
intention. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1-6.
http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00638.
Schmidt, S., Jo, H., Wittmann, M., & Hinterberger, T. (2016). ‘Catching the waves’ –
slow cortical potentials as moderator of voluntary action. Neuroscience and
Biobehavioral Reviews, 68, 639-650.
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Appendix G: S Task Instructions
Hello! In this task, a small clock will be presented in the middle of the screen. After a
short time, it will start to rotate from a random position. Please focus on the middle of
the clock and at the same time pay attention to the position of the clockhand.
You will be listening for a brief tone to be played. You will report where the clockhand
was when you first heard the tone.
To do this, first press the left mouse button anytime after the tone is played. This will
stop the clock. Note that this is NOT a reaction time task - do not try to press the mouse
right when the tone occurs. Just press the button after within a few seconds after you
hear the tone. Then follow the instructions on screen to report the clockhand position.
You will first complete some training trails so you can get used to the task. Then you
will complete some regular trials.
Press the left mouse button to continue.
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Appendix H: M Task Instructions
Hello! In this task, a small clock will be presented in the middle of the screen. After a
short time, it will start to rotate from a random position. Please focus your eyes on the
center of the clock and at the same time pay attention to the position of the clockhand.
During this task you will be clicking the left mouse button and reporting where the
clockhand was when you began your click.
Please allow the clockhand to make at least one full rotation before you make your
click. You may click anytime after it has made one rotation.
Please make your click as spontaneously as possible – click when the urge arises. Do
not plan the click ahead of time. Be spontaneous on each trial.
After your click, follow the on-screen instructions to make your report. Please report the
time when you began your movement (when you began your click).
A final note: please try to keep from blinking or moving your eyes or body during the
task. If you must blink or move, please do so between trials. Press the left mouse button
to continue.
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Appendix I: W Task Instructions
Hello! In this task, a small clock will be presented in the middle of the screen. After a
short time, it will start to rotate from a random position. Please focus your eyes on the
center of the clock and at the same time pay attention to the position of the clockhand.
During this task you will be clicking the left mouse button and reporting where the
clockhand was when you had the intention to click.
Please allow the clockhand to make at least one full rotation before you make your
click. You may click anytime after it has made one rotation.
Please make your click as spontaneously as possible – click when the urge arises. Do
not plan the click ahead of time. Be spontaneous on each trial.
After your click, follow the on-screen instructions to make your report. Please report the
time when you first had the intention to click.
A final note: please try to keep from blinking or moving your eyes or body during the
task. If you must blink or move, please do so between trials. Press the left mouse button
to continue.
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Appendix J: Example of a Preplanning Question (W Task)
Did you preplan any of your movements during any of the 60 regular trials you just
completed?
If no, please press 0.
If yes, please press the number next to the correct estimate of how many times you
preplanned.
1 = 5 times or less
2 = 6-10 times
3 = 11-15 times
4 = 16-20 times
5 = 21 or more times
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Appendix K: S Task Performance

Participant

Grand
Average

S Task Performance
Average
(seconds)
0.048
0.091
0.141
0.054
0.058
0.015
0.040
0.043
0.067
0.033
0.082
0.062
0.005
0.021
0.003
0.006
0.152
0.042
0.020
0.195
0.017
0.104
0.053
0.059
0.064
0.053
0.004
0.043
0.030

0.055
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St. Dev.
(seconds)
0.089
0.102
0.115
0.116
0.088
0.054
0.133
0.115
0.148
0.076
0.155
0.085
0.050
0.109
0.079
0.084
0.088
0.098
0.074
0.215
0.068
0.043
0.077
0.103
0.075
0.038
0.099
0.070
0.064

0.093
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Appendix L: EMG Corrections

Participant

Grand
Averages

EMG Corrections
M Task (seconds)
Standard
Average
Deviation
0.103
0.027
0.134
0.024
0.148
0.024
0.138
0.027
0.141
0.028
0.150
0.021
0.145
0.022
0.128
0.030
0.140
0.027
0.131
0.024
0.141
0.030
0.108
0.023
0.131
0.028
0.117
0.024
0.125
0.030
0.112
0.026
0.141
0.028
0.145
0.025
0.117
0.020
0.142
0.030
0.107
0.021
0.131
0.028

0.130

0.029
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W Task (seconds)
Standard
Average
Deviation
0.107
0.029
0.137
0.024
0.137
0.030
0.135
0.027
0.128
0.026
0.150
0.022
0.143
0.026
0.142
0.027
0.147
0.028
0.144
0.030
0.140
0.023
0.116
0.023
0.127
0.029
0.132
0.029
0.131
0.046
0.115
0.023
0.149
0.025
0.143
0.026
0.133
0.026
0.146
0.023
0.108
0.025
0.134
0.026

0.133

0.030

Appendix M: M Task and W Task Performance
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Appendix M: M Task and W Task Performance

M Task and W Task Performance
Participant M Task (seconds) W Task (seconds)
M-First
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
0.113
0.078
0.096
0.176
0.109
0.075
0.095
0.077
0.157
0.076
0.063
0.246
0.164
0.371
0.006
0.435
0.156
0.122
-0.363
0.217
0.100
0.182
-0.054
0.123
0.133
0.068
-0.463
0.267
0.089
0.153
0.049
0.185
0.091
0.104
0.077
0.135
0.223
0.051
0.245
0.097
Average
0.117
0.169
-0.007
0.282
W-First
0.031
0.174
0.099
0.109
0.097
0.105
0.125
0.080
0.079
0.284
0.010
0.225
-0.026
0.132
0.212
0.087
0.098
0.050
0.132
0.040
0.023
0.067
0.010
0.051
0.183
0.052
0.183
0.043
0.144
0.056
0.094
0.125
0.153
0.055
0.089
0.104
-0.180
0.293
0.011
0.364
0.104
0.047
0.132
0.043
0.105
0.064
0.216
0.109
Average
0.066
0.166
0.110
0.161
Grand
Averages

0.088

0.169
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0.058

0.230
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Appendix N: M Task and W Task Performance (Data Uncorrected by EMG)

M Task and W Task Performance (EMG
Uncorrected)
Participant
M Task (seconds) W Task (seconds)
St.
St.
M-First
Average
Dev
Average
Dev
0.010
0.071
0.005
0.079
-0.022
0.076
-0.044
0.073
0.020
0.071
-0.188
0.198
0.044
0.414
-0.112
0.465
0.034
0.114
-0.369
0.437
-0.240
0.168
-0.208
0.121
0.014
0.088
-0.457
0.412
-0.058
0.178
-0.095
0.176
-0.046
0.108
-0.069
0.123
0.094
0.053
0.109
0.092
Average
-0.015
0.183
-0.134
0.302
W-First
-0.192
0.170
-0.035
0.127
-0.044
0.103
0.004
0.081
-0.051
0.327
-0.125
0.333
-0.169
0.130
0.068
0.086
-0.022
0.120
-0.011
0.034
-0.086
0.064
-0.104
0.051
0.054
0.039
0.057
0.032
0.018
0.080
-0.032
0.124
0.030
0.054
-0.029
0.154
-0.262
0.333
-0.121
0.369
-0.009
0.047
0.000
0.039
0.010
0.132
0.126
0.160
Average
-0.060
0.189
-0.016
0.170
Grand
Averages

-0.040

0.188
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-0.069

0.245
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Appendix O: PEQ Results

Post-Experiment Questionnaire Results

Question

Group

Yes

Maybe

No

Chi Sq.

df

Asymptotic
significance (2sided)

PEQ1

M-First
W-First

4
6

0
0

5
4

0.460

1

0.498

PEQ2

M-First
W-First

5
8

1
0

3
2

1.845

2

0.398

PEQ3

M-First
W-First

8
9

0
0

1
1

0.006

1

0.937

PEQ4

M-First

9

0

0

0.950

1

0.330

W-First

9

0

1

PEQ5

M-First
W-First

3
7

1
2

5
1

4.560

2

0.102

PEQ6

M-First
W-First

1
2

2
2

6
6

0.281

2

0.869

PEQ7

M-First
W-First

3
1

0
0

6
9

1.552

1

0.213

PEQ8

M-First
W-First

7
6

0
0

2
4

0.693

1

0.405

PEQ9

M-First
W-First

0
0

0
1

9
9

0.950

1

0.330

PEQ10

M-First
W-First

intention
2
0

urge
4
3

impulse
2
4

3.767

3

0.288
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other
1
3

